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This thesis uses new archival and oral sources to analyse the politics of Sarawak’s 
early left-wing movement and its leaders between 1945 and 1963. Departing from 
previous studies, I argue that it was a literary revolution among the young rather than 
clandestine communist organisation that gave rise to the generation of revolution-
minded young Chinese during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Through interviews 
with veterans, the thesis clarifies the underground processes that led to the founding 
of the Sarawak Liberation League in July 1953, the League’s subsequent ‘united 
front’ politics, and its decision to take the ‘armed struggle’ route in December 1962. 
Against ‘Chinese chauvinist’ charges, I emphasize instead the minzu-nationalist vision 
of the ‘united front’ movement and argue that previous scholars have tended to 
neglect the League’s minzu-nationalist identity in accounting for its success during the 
‘united front’ years. 
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A Note on Romanisation 
 
In this thesis, I have retained the Chinese dialect names of personalities and 
organizations as they were used in the contemporary English-language primary 
sources. The Chinese in Malaysia continue to preserve their dialect identities in the 
English transliteration of their names up to this day. In a few cases where I cannot 
trace the person’s dialect name, I have had to seek recourse to pinyin. To avoid 
confusion, the Chinese characters of personalities and organizations are provided 
when they first appear. In order to be consistent, I have used the Wade-Giles system 
of transliteration for the well-known people and organizations of the time. Hence, 





 Moments after news of the Brunei Revolt reached Lim Ho Kui’s ears, his 
mind had been set on taking the revolution in Sarawak to the next phase of armed 
struggle. In December 1962, at the age of twenty-six, Lim Ho Kui, a Sarawak-born 
second generation Chinese, was the leader of at least one thousand other Chinese 
youths organised under the Sarawak Liberation League (SLL) – a Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionary organisation engaged in a nationalist liberation struggle for their 
adopted homeland Sarawak. That day, Lim put pen to paper and signed an order that 
was soon disseminated through secretly established channels to hundreds of cadres 
spread across the country. The message was for them to ‘prepare for armed struggle’,1 
which was declared in opposition to the impending formation of the state of Malaysia. 
Over the next twenty-seven years, SLL waged a guerrilla war against the withdrawing 
British Empire and the newly installed Malaysian government for the broadly framed 
goals of achieving Sarawak’s national independence and a socialist revolution. How 
did a twenty-six year old second-generation migrant come to lead an armed 
communist revolution in this relatively isolated Southeast Asian country? 
 
1.1 Global Imperialism and the Making of Sarawak 
 
The state of Sarawak that entered into the young Chinese’s consciousness as a 
natural end-goal for their quest for nationalist independence during the early 1950s 
was in fact a relatively new political entity. From the earliest times, human activity on 
the north coast of Borneo was centred on the river systems, which flow towards the 
China Sea from the island’s great Northeast-Southwest mountain range. In general, 
people there lived in relative isolation of one another and were hence able to preserve 
their historical way of life until late in the twentieth century. A widely accepted, 
though grossly simplified, narrative of Sarawak’s ethnographic history begins with 
the Penans and Punans, who are believed to be the earliest original inhabitants of the 
land. Until the 1960s, these tribal people continue to lead hunter-gather lifestyles in 
the forests and are believed to have been driven there from the coasts by later 
                                                 
1 Interview with Lim Ho Kui, 7.3.2007.  
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migrants, probably the Kenyahs and Kayans. While the Kenyahs and Kayans are 
native to Borneo, they came from south of the watershed and have a higher propensity 
for warfare than the others. The Land Dayaks, noted for their traditional docility, were 
originally river dwellers close to present-day Kuching, but were driven to hill tops by 
the later migrants. Also living by the river were the Ibans (also known as Sea Dayaks), 
who loved war and were frequently involved in ‘piracy’. They form the largest ethnic 
group in Sarawak today, but their numbers only increased with their mass migration 
from central Borneo from the mid-nineteenth century.2 By and large, these indigenous 
peoples of Borneo practised shifting agriculture, lived in longhouses and were highly 
egalitarian in their social organization. They were animists, who took their enemies’ 
heads for spiritual gratification.3 
 
It was the coastal Malays who first imposed a state on these peoples of 
northern Borneo. From the fifteenth century, the Brunei Sultan – a Malay-Muslim raja 
(king) – dominated the northern littoral of the Borneo Island. The Bruneians trace 
their ancestral lineage to the great Johor sultanate. In theory, the raja, as God’s 
representative on earth, ruled spiritually as the physical embodiment of the state, 
while temporal affairs were run with the nobility centred around the Sultan’s court. As 
in the case of other Southeast Asian maritime states during the Age of Commerce, the 
key to power and wealth lay in the state’s ability to attract, safeguard and tax Chinese, 
Indian, Arabic and European traders.4 The state, in turn, collaborated with groups of 
pagan people, from whom they collected tax and occasionally levied military service. 
At its peak in the sixteenth century, Brunei, on its seat of power in the Brunei Bay 
commanded a string of ports that linked Manila in the north to Banjermasin on the 
south coast of Borneo.5 ‘Sarawak’ was a province of Brunei that took its name from 
the first major river system west of Tanjong (Cape) Datu on the north-western corner 
of Borneo.  
 
                                                 
2 Robert Pringle, Rajah and Rebels:The Ibans of Sarawak under Brooke Rule, 1841-1941 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 247-82. 
3 Steve Runciman, The White Rajahs, A History of Sarawak from 1841 to 1946 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), Chapter 1.  
4 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, Volume 2, Expansion and Crisis (New Haven, 
Yale University Press, 1993). 
5 Graham Saunders, A History of Brunei (London: Routledge, 2002 [1994]), pp. 35-48. 
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The founding of modern Sarawak in 1841 can be traced to historical processes 
that began to unravel in the mid-eighteenth century: Britain’s Industrial Revolution, 
the rise of the doctrine of free trade, Britain’s desire to break open the China market, 
and the increasing willingness of Western powers to annex territorial colonies and 
govern native peoples directly. Beginning in India, then spreading across the crescent 
arc of the Indian Ocean, the British coerced, defeated and replaced Islamic regimes 
and attained their ‘imperial meridian’ by the mid-nineteenth century.6 In Southeast 
Asia, the British were at first mainly interested in securing the maritime trade route to 
China, along which lay the narrow Straits of Malacca – a strategic bottleneck. To this 
end, the colony of the Straits Settlements was founded in 1826 following the 
successive acquisitions of Penang (1786), Singapore (1819) and Malacca (1824) from 
the local Malay sultans and the Dutch (for Malacca). James Brooke, a British 
adventurer, was driven by the same set of motivations – a desire to secure an 
alternative trade route to China and end piracy in the North Bornean waters – when he 
intervened in Brunei politics and wrenched the province of Sarawak from Brunei rule. 
Yet Sarawak had neither the strategic positioning nor the natural resources to induce 
Britain’s formal colonisation despite James Brookes’ intense lobbying. Shunned by 
the British, the White Rajah dynasty would rule Sarawak themselves for a hundred 
years.7  
 
Brooke rule laid the foundations of Sarawak’s modern state, economy and 
society. The Brookes pacified the Iban ‘piracy problem’ on the frontier river systems 
and obtained successive ‘treaties’ from Brunei to rule over larger and larger tracts of 
territory. At the expense of Brunei’s sovereignty, the Brooke state expanded 
eastwards river by river – the Sarawak river (1841); Sadong, Lupar, Saribas and Krian 
(1853); Rejang, Oya, Mukah and Bintulu (1863); Niah and Baram (1882); Trusan 
(1884); Limbang (1890); and Lawas (1905) – to reach its present boundaries.8 The 
Brookes ruled ostensibly as Malay princes with absolute power: they sought to 
preserve the indigenous way of life, used local (rather than Bruneian or Arab) Malay 
                                                 
6 Chris Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World (London: Longman, 1989). 
7 Runciman, White Rajahs, pp. 56-156. Pringle, Rajah and Rebels, pp. 99-100. 
8 The acquisition of Limbang river in 1890 was the most controversial – it split Brunei into two non-
contiguous halves. Brunei itself would have been encroached if not for the intervention of the British 
Colonial Office. See Runciman, White Rajahs, pp. 194-201. 
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chiefs as administrators and mobilized the Ibans for warfare.9 Yet in other ways too, 
the nature of the state was fundamentally altered. A formal state bureaucracy 
gradually emerged with the introduction of an elite class of European administrators – 
the Sarawak Administrative Service. The state was split into five administrative 
‘Divisions’, which was further broken down into ‘districts’.10 The hitherto erratic 
collection of the annual fixed tax on the Malay ‘head’ (individual) and the Iban ‘bilik’ 
(household) was regularized. From 1855, the first raja (r. 1841 – 1867) ruled with the 
assistance of a ‘Supreme Council’ of European and Malay advisors. Then in 1867, the 
second raja (Charles Brooke, r. 1867 – 1917) convened the ‘Council Negri’, a 
triennial assembly of the state’s European officers and indigenous leaders, as a 
symbol of the unity of the state and its peoples. These two councils represented the 
monarch’s highest executive and legislative bodies, while constitutional reforms 
imposed checks against the personal rule of the third raja (Charles Vyner Brooke, r. 
1917 – 1941). Internally, the state’s security was maintained by the police (mainly 
Malay) and the para-military Sarawak Rangers (mainly Iban). Externally, Sarawak 
came under formal British ‘protection’ from 1888.11 
 
The Brookes wished to create a thriving economy in Sarawak by selling its 
minerals and cash crops, but unlike other European colonizers, they wanted, at least in 
theory, to achieve this with minimal European capital investment and the smallest 
possible change to the native way of life. While the mining of minerals was the sole 
sector the Brookes were prepared to open to Western capital, unfortunately, only 
insignificant amounts of coal (at Simunjan, Silantek and Muara) and oil (Miri) was 
discovered.12 The Brookes also did not have sufficient political and financial will, 
despite their professed aims to do so, to convert the indigenous peoples from shifting 
cultivation to cash crop agriculture.13 Brooke reluctance to introduce Western capital 
and to ‘reform’ native culture meant that more so than other forms of colonial 
                                                 
9 Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels, p. 329. 
10 These administrative ‘Divisions’ were determined, by and large, by the stages of state’s historical 
expansion. First Division – Rivers Sarawak and Sadong; Second Division – Lupar, Maru, Kalaka; 
Third Division – Rejang, Matu, Oya, Mukah, Bintulu; Fourth Division – Niah and Baram; Fifth 
Division – Limbang, Trusan and Lawas. 
11 Bob Reece, The Name of Brooke: the end of White Rajah rule in Sarawak (KL: OUP, 1982),  pp. 1-
12. 
12 Ooi Keat Gin, Of Free Trade and Native Interests: The Brookes and the Economic Development of 
Sarawak, 1841-1941 (KL: Oxford University Press, 1997), Chapter 4. 
13 Ibid., Chapter 5. 
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government in Southeast Asia, Sarawak came to rely on Chinese migrant traders, 
labour and agriculturists for the state’s economic development. With the exception of 
oil, the state’s major export items throughout the century of Brooke rule – sago, 
jungle produce, antimony, quicksilver, pepper, rubber, gold and gambier – were 
mainly owned by Chinese interests. The rubber boom of the early the twentieth 
century were the golden years of Sarawak’s economy, which saw the state’s export 
revenue rose from consistently below $10 million in the first decade to $60 million in 
1929.14 
 
 While colonial governments worldwide centralized their administrations, 
devolved power to the colonised and started to provide social services in the first 
decades of the twentieth century, Brooke rule remained personal, paternalistic and 
minimalist to the end. The economic boom of the pre-Depression years and the 
subsequent slump of the 1930s indicated that Sarawak was already an integral state 
within the global economy and international system by the early twentieth century. By 
the 1930s, the anachronism of preserving the native way of life at all costs was 
becoming apparent. This was revealed most palpably in the lack of colonial education. 
In 1937, a government survey of Sarawak’s education system by a seconded Malayan 
official was highly critical of the non-existence of state-funded education for the non-
Malay native peoples and the unimaginative and deficient system of schools for 
Malays. The report pointed out that while most Crown Colonies spent between 7% 
and 12% of their annual revenue on education, Sarawak was spending 2% to 5%.15 
While the government ran schools for Malays to train them for administrative posts, 
the education of the Ibans, Land Dayaks and other indigenous peoples were left 
entirely to the Christian missions. The Chinese community paid for their own 
privately-funded school system, giving rise to the educational disparity between the 
Chinese and other peoples. Of the 14,000 students enrolled in all Sarawak schools in 
1936, three-quarters were Chinese in independent Chinese and mission schools.16  
                                                 
14 These were the Straits dollars, $8.57 of which was pegged to one sterling pound from 1906. This rate 
of exchange was generally maintained until 1941. For export value and numbers, see Ooi, Of Free 
Trade and Native Interests, pp. xxiv and 90-3. To be more precise, the boom years were between 1910 
and 1920, the late 1920s and the late 1930s. See Craig Lockard, From Kampung to City, A Social 
History of Kuching Malaysia, 1820 – 1970 (Ohio: Center for International Studies Ohio University, 
1987), p. 86. 
15 ‘Hammond Report on Education’, p. 84. 
16 Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels, p. 339. 
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 The moral dilemmas of the Brooke authority translated into a series of internal 
political crises during the 1930s that brought the state to the brink of collapse. First, 
the uncertain constitutional future of the state was exacerbated by a family feud 
amongst the Brookes. Charles Vyner Brooke, who had no male issue, wavered 
between passing the kingship to the rightful heir (his nephew) and divesting the state 
to a European administrative oligarchy in exchange for a life-long endowment. 
Second, the European officers of the administration were split between Brooke 
loyalists who wanted to retain the personal and ad-hoc nature of governance and a 
new breed who wanted to centralize the bureaucracy and rationalize the state’s system 
of justice.17 While the British Colonial Office could have intervened, throughout the 
1930s, they were satisfied stay on the sidelines.18 In October 1941, at the centennial 
anniversary of Brooke rule, an inconclusive compromise was reached between the 
raja and his administrators in the form of the nine ‘Cardinal Principles’ constitution: 1) 
the administration paid the raja $2,000,000 for the surrender of his absolute powers to 
constitutional checks, 2) in exchange for which the European administrative oligarchy 
kept their jobs and independence from the British, and 3) the people were guaranteed 
the improvement of social and education services and the eventual self-government of 
Sarawak.19 The Japanese invasion would upset the pace of Sarawak’s constitutional 
reforms. 
 
1.2 The Chinese in Sarawak 
 
 The political, economic and social structures with and around which the 
Chinese in Sarawak negotiated their daily lives had much to do with the prevailing 
patterns of modern Chinese migration. Chinese migrants were pushed out of their 
homeland by China’s deteriorating population-to-land ratio over the two centuries 
from 1650, when population trebled to 380 million in the 1850s while arable land 
merely doubled. Exporting its male labour was one of the last resorts the family – as 
                                                 
17 Reece, Name of Brooke¸ pp. 40-93. 
18 Ibid., pp. 94-127. 
19 Reece, Name of Brooke, pp. 80-1. The looming Japanese invasion gave the whole affair an air of 
farce, which was reinforced by the raja’s flight to Australia within two days of the constitution’s 
proclamation. To the credit of the European administrative oligarchy, they stood their ground when the 
Japanese invaded. C. D. Le Gros Clarke, the Chief Secretary, refused to flee Sarawak, was interned by 
the Japanese and summarily executed towards the end of the war. 
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the basic unit of Chinese economic organisation – could and did take.20 As a familial 
strategy of survival, the male migrant was expected to contribute to the livelihood of 
the family, and eventually to return and perpetuate the family line. Such a migrant 
was always more of a sojourner (huaqiao) than a permanent settler. To the sojourner, 
the native-place was an important identity marker, which banded them together in the 
venue society for ‘security, business cooperation and moral support’.21 The Chinese 
living on the southern provinces of Fujian and Guangdong had an almost two 
thousand-year history of maritime trading contacts with the peoples of Nanyang 
(literally, the South Seas, i.e. today’s Southeast Asia).22 Navigating the China Sea was 
hence not a new endeavour for them though it took the opening of foreign treaty ports 
in China and the European colonisation of territorial Southeast Asia in the mid-
nineteenth century to really trigger their large-scale seaward migration. In one 
hundred years, between ten and sixteen million Overseas Chinese sojourned in 
Southeast Asia.23 
 
 Economic motivations and opportunities mediated through compatriot 
networks combined to determine the settlement patterns and occupational orientations 
of the Chinese sojourners across Southeast Asia. Five major speech groups dominated 
the migration traffic: the Hokkien (Minnan) of Southern Fujian around the port of 
Xiamen (or Amoy), Cantonese (Guangfu) of the Pearl River Delta, Teochew of the 
Han River Delta in Northeast Guangdong, Hakka (Kejia) of the mountainous regions 
of the two provinces and Hailam (Hainan) of the Hainan Island.24 In 1841, it was 
estimated that there were 1,000 Chinese in Sarawak. The first to arrive were Hakka 
gold-miners,25 who crossed the watershed from West Borneo to mine new-found gold 
at Bau on the Sarawak River in the 1840s. Hokkien and Teochew merchants, who had 
already established trading concerns in Singapore, extended their business networks 
                                                 
20 Philip Kuhn, Chinese Among Others, Emigration in Modern Times (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 
13-4. 
21 Ibid., pp. 43-6. 
22 Wang Gungwu, The Nanhai Trade, Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea (Singapore: Eastern 
Universities Press, 2003 [1958]). 
23 For a recent study that sets Chinese migration abroad in a global context, see Adam Mckeown, 
‘Global Migration, 1846-1940’ in Journal of World History, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 155-189. Mckeown 
shows that both Chinese and Indian long-distance migration during the period equaled European 
transatlantic migration, both in terms of volume and economic impact on recipient territories. 
24 Kuhn, Chinese Among Others, pp. 33-43. 
25 They were already mining gold in West Borneo since the mid-eighteenth century. See Wang Tai 
Peng, The Origins of Chinese Kongsi (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1994 [1977]). 
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to Kuching after Brooke rule was instituted. From 1901, the Brooke government 
contracted Foochows (Fuzhou) of Northern Fujian and some Cantonese to colonise 
the Rejang Delta in the Third Division with padi fields. By 1909, a government 
census counted 45,000 Chinese, or one-tenth of total population. The next twenty 
years were the rubber boom era, during which the majority of Chinese agriculturists, 
especially the Foochows in the Rejang valley, converted from padi to rubber 
cultivation. Those years saw a net increase in Chinese immigration so that by 1939, 
the Chinese population had increased threefold to 124,000 or one-fourth (25.5%) of 
Sarawak’s population.26  
 
 The ethnic Chinese revolutionaries of post-war Sarawak were the children of 
the rubber boom migrants. Born in the 1930s, most of them lived through the end of 
Brooke rule, the Japanese Occupation and British colonialism. Their ‘socialist 
revolution’ of the 1950s was aimed as much to break down the colonial society into 
which they were born as to build a new and more equitable post-colonial society. As 
indicated above, the Chinese in pre-war Sarawak were segregated by their economic 
niches. In the commercialized colonial society, social status and political leadership 
within each sub-ethnic community was determined by wealth. Native-place 
associations, such as the Hokkien and Teochew associations, provided welfare 
services (temple services, funeral, poverty aid) to their compatriots. The Brookes in 
turn appointed the wealthiest towkays (merchants in Chinese) from these associations 
to be ‘kapitans china’ to represent their respective speech-group communities in 
government. Below the towkay leaders in the social hierarchy were the middle-level 
merchants, English-educated civil servants and the intelligentsia who formed the 
‘middle class’ of the society. The ‘working class’ included small traders, artisans, 
shop assistants, hawkers and labourers.27 Brooke patronage of the Chinese towkay 
leaders served to consolidate their positions at the apex of Sarawak economy and 
society. The leadership of the Hokkien and Teochew communities, for example, 
remained in the Ong Ewe Hai and Law Kian Huat families respectively for the entire 
                                                 
26 No census was taken between 1909 and 1939, but it can easily be inferred that the majority of the 
population increase was gained before the Great Depression of 1929. After 1929, Sarawak, like other 
European colonial states, stopped accepting new migrants from China. See Craig Lockard, Chinese 
Immigration and Society in Sarawak, 1868-1917 (Sibu: Sarawak Chinese Cultural Association, 2003), 
pp. 65-104. 
27 Lockard, Social History of Kuching, pp. 70-1. 
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length of Brooke rule. The extended Ong family in particular ran a business empire 
that ranged from sago milling to the highly lucrative Bian Chiang Bank.28 
 
The Sarawak Chinese remained relatively innocent in politics compared to 
their counterparts in the rest of Southeast Asia. The extension of Chinese political 
party networks across Southeast Asia left Sarawak unscathed. By 1926, the Chinese 
Kuomintang (KMT) had set up some three hundred chapters in Burma, French 
Indochina, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), the Philippines and 
Thailand, with a 31,000-strong membership that doubled in eight years.29 In Kuching, 
a small KMT chapter was set up but it was mostly inactive by the 1930s. The Chinese 
in Sarawak appear to have been less nationalistic than other Chinese in Southeast Asia. 
The most obvious sign of the Sarawak Chinese detachment from Chinese nationalism 
is the persistence of speech-group parochialism in the education system. Unlike in 
Singapore and Malaya, where Chinese schools began to teach in Guoyu (the Chinese 
national language, Mandarin) from the 1920s, Sarawak’s Chinese schools continued 
to teach in their respective dialects.30 It was only as the Sino-Japanese war escalated 
after 1937 that political interest in China grew and the various sub-groups set aside 
their differences to form a cross-dialect China Relief Fund chapter in Sarawak.31 Until 
the Second World War, the Chinese in Sarawak were far from seeing themselves as 
one community.  
 
1.3 War, Nationalism, Decolonization 
 
The Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation of Southeast Asia shattered 
the myth of European racial superiority and ended the political legitimacy of 
European empires. The British, who were responsible for Sarawak’s defence since the 
1888 treaty, put up a token form of defence. The Japanese were hence able to invade 
Sarawak with minimal fighting and occupied the territory between December 1941 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 124. 
29 Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement, 1937-1941 (New York: Center for 
East Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1970), pp. 6-8. 
30 Lockard, Social History of Kuching, p. 123. See also Ooi Keat Gin, ‘Chinese Vernacular Education 
in Sarawak During Brooke Rule 1841-1946’ in Modern Asian Studies, 28, no. pt.3, 1994, pp. 503-31. 
31 Lockard, Social History of Kuching, p. 129. 
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and September 1945.32 Like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the Chinese community 
bore the brunt of Japanese colonial rule for their support of the China Relief Fund. 
During the occupation, some Chinese in the First Division organised an Anti-Fascist 
League – an underground resistance movement – though they limited themselves to 
operations aimed at relieving the people’s hardships (See Chapter 2.1). No general 
massacre of the Chinese like the ‘Sook Ching Movement’ of Singapore took place in 
Sarawak. General Malay collaboration with the Japanese caused bitter communal 
clashes between the Chinese and Malays in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
Overall, the war had the effect of greatly increasing the appeal of Chinese nationalism 
to the Chinese in Sarawak.33  
 
War exposed the anachronism and fragility of the Brooke family’s dynastic 
rule in Sarawak and set in train a process of modernisation and rationalisation of the 
state to prepare the people for eventual independence. At the end of war, the hefty of 
cost of the Australian military re-occupation, the advanced age of the raja and his 
distrust of his nephew, the heir, persuaded Charles Vyner Brooke to cede Sarawak to 
the British Colonial Office for a financial settlement of £100,000. For the British, the 
strategic significance of Sarawak and Brunei oil and the general threat of Indonesian 
nationalism and American anti-colonial sentiments to British imperial interests in 
Southeast Asia called for rapid intervention.34 In February 1946, the Colonial Office 
announced the case for cession and within three months, the approval of ‘local 
opinion’ was obtained when pro-cession motions were passed with slim minorities in 
both the Council Negri and Supreme Council.35 The Malay aristocracy, which had 
been favoured by the Brooke regime, was divided between pro and anti-cession 
factions. The anti-cession campaign developed into a proto-nationalist movement 
when members of the Malay elite (Malay National Union), some educated Dayaks 
(Sarawak Dayak Association) and the left-wing Chinese intelligentsia (see Chapter 
2.1) opposed the strong arm tactics of British and campaigned for the return of the 
raja. However, the neglect of education and the resultant lack of political awareness, 
especially among the non-Malay indigenous peoples, precluded the mobilization of an 
                                                 
32 Bob Reece, Masa Jepun, Sarawak under the Japanese, 1941-1945, (Kuching: Sarawak Literary 
Society, 1998). 
33 Ibid., p. 153. 
34 Reece, Name of Brooke, pp. 193-4. 
35 Ibid., pp. 198-245. 
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organisation on a scale akin to the United Malays National Organisation in Malaya to 
oppose British constitutional impositions. Nonetheless, the movement lingered on 
among the Malays and only petered out after the assassination of the Sarawak British 
governor in 1949 prompted severe repression.36 
 
 British colonial rule in Sarawak lasted between July 1946 and September 1963. 
The British obtained the mandate for colonial rule by promising to develop Sarawak 
and prepare its people for independence as promised by the 1941 Nine Principle 
Constitution. Broadly speaking, the sixteen years of British colonial rule in Sarawak 
can be divided into three phases.37 1946 to 1953 was the reconstruction phase, when 
the colonial government was preoccupied with the restoration of the basic 
infrastructure of Sarawak after three years of destruction and neglect. 1953 to 1959 
can be characterised as the development phase, during which more funds were 
devoted to the expansion of Sarawak’s economy and the increased provision of social 
services in education, health and housing to the people. The final phase – 1959 to 
1963 – were four heady years of when constitutional reforms from the top were met 
with political activism from below: political parties were formed, local leaders were 
given the first taste of self-government, and the debate on Sarawak’s future in the 
constitutional design of ‘Malaysia’ caused deep divisions among the people.  
 
 Political developments in Sarawak need also be read in the context of global 
developments. As the Cold War between the Soviet-led Communist bloc and the 
American spearheaded ‘free world’ intensified in 1948, the Americans were 
increasingly willing to tone down their anti-colonial expectations with respect to their 
Western European allies and appreciate the anti-Communist effect of European 
colonial rule in Afro-Asian countries.38  The simultaneous outbreak of communist 
uprisings in Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma and the ‘loss’ of China to 
communism in 1949 made Asia the critical arena, where the balance of power in the 
Cold War might be tipped either way. The West showed its determination to contain 
the ‘domino effect’ of communism in Asia in the Korea (1950-4) and Vietnam Wars 
(1950-75). The long-term British goal was to create a solid pro-British and anti-
                                                 
36 Ibid., pp. 246-83. 
37 Vernon Porritt, British Colonial Rule in Sarawak, 1946-1963 (KL: OUP, 1997), pp. 1-7. 
38 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1961-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 1-28.  
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Communist state from its Southeast Asian colonies (Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, 
Brunei and North Borneo), which culminated in the formation of ‘Malaysia’ in 
September 1963. This intent was most clearly expressed in the creation of the position 
of the British Commissioner-General of Southeast Asia in 194839 and the Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954. In Southeast Asian Cold War politics, 
there was also the additional element of the suspect political loyalty of the ten-million 
strong Chinese diaspora. 40  Committing the hearts and minds of the Chinese in 
Sarawak to the British liberal-democratic outlook of the world hence was a central 
challenge to British colonial policy.  
 
1.4 Interpreting the Revolution: Communism, Nationalism and Leadership 
 
The history of communism in Sarawak can be divided broadly into four phases: 
1) Between 1945 and 1953, some left-wing Chinese intelligentsia – journalists and 
teachers – challenged the traditional authority of the community’s merchant leaders 
and attracted a strong following among Chinese school students. 2) From 1953 to 
1963, these young Chinese founded the first Sarawak-oriented underground 
communist revolutionary organisation – the Sarawak Liberation League (henceforth, 
SLL) – and created a united front of students, workers, peasants and a political party 
to agitate for Sarawak’s national independence through constitutional means. 3) For 
ten years after 1963, the Sarawak Liberation League fought a guerrilla war against the 
‘neo-colonial’ setup of Malaysia in the forests of Kalimantan. Between 1963 and 
1966, they allied with Brunei’s Party Rakyat to form the state of North Kalimantan, 
with the support of Indonesia and China. 4) 1973 – 1990 were years of rapid decline 
after the majority of the guerrilla fighters left the jungles in the Sri Aman peace 
accords of 1973. The last remnants of the movement gave up their armed struggle in 
1990 after the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989. This thesis examines the 
origins of the revolution during its first two phases.  
 
The origins and nature of the Sarawak Liberation League and its revolutionary 
goal were first published in Tim Hardy’s The Danger Within: A History of the 
                                                 
39 Peter Lyon, ‘MacDonald, Malcolm John (1901–1981)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn., May 2008. 
40 For a contemporary view, see C.P. Fitzgerald, The Third China: the Chinese communities in South-
East Asia (Singapore: D. Moore, 1969). 
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Clandestine Communist Organisation in Sarawak.41 The author was the Deputy Head 
of the Sarawak Special Branch (the domestic intelligence agency) and had full access 
to captured communist documents.42 The communist movement’s political goal was 
‘the establishment of a new democratic society, then a socialist society and finally a 
communist society’ in Sarawak.43 The main thrust of Hardy’s argument lies in its 
exposure of this tight knit communist outfit and to prove that the broad ‘united front’ 
of left-wing political parties, trade unions, farmers’ associations, student bodies were 
in fact controlled by the underground communist movement. Why and how did SLL 
become a serious political contender and a potent security threat in 1963? Hardy’s 
answer lies in the modus operandi of the revolutionary organisation – its political goal, 
organisation, training methods, security measures, propaganda strategy and their work 
among the native. In this thesis, I argue that though important, communist thought and 
the highly efficient underground organisation were not the determining factors in 
accounting for the success of SLL in its first two phases of development. Hardy’s 
emphasis on communist thought and organisation was made at the expense of 
analysing the movement’s social context and the influence of personalities on the 
outcome of events. His insensitivity to the social roots of the revolution is most 
evident in his reading of the movement’s connection with the Chinese community: 
 
The CCO [Clandestine Communist Organisation] is 100 per cent 
Chinese in make up but it cannot be emphasised too often that this does 
not indicate that all or even many Chinese in Sarawak are 
communists…Nevertheless the non-communist majority does bear 
some measure of responsibility for the serious state of affairs that 
exists.44 
 
 Exactly what responsibility the Chinese community should bear was addressed, 
to some extent, by Justus van der Kroef in a scholarly article published a year later. In 
‘Communism and Communalism in Sarawak’, van der Kroef argues that it was not so 
much the long-term desire to set up a communist society as the championing of 
                                                 
41 Tim Hardy, The Danger Within: A History of the Clandestine Communist Organisation in Sarawak 
(Kuching: Sarawak Information Service, 1963). 
42 Tim Hardy, A Solipsist Monogatory: The Memoirs of Tim Hardy (unpublished manuscript, 2005), p. 
149. 
43 Hardy, Danger Within, p. 4. 
44 Ibid., p. 1. 
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Chinese communal interests that made communism such a powerful force in Sarawak 
politics.45 While it is true that the communist movement defended Chinese education 
against colonial ‘national’ education reforms during the early 1960s, to suggest that 
these moves were made to exploit Chinese communalism for the ultimate interests of 
the communists is to take colonial propaganda at face value and to deny the 
communists the possibility of a legitimate nationalist vision for post-colonial Sarawak. 
Van der Kroef’s total reliance on English language sources, particularly the colonial 
news publications Sarawak by the Week and the Sarawak Gazette, may in part explain 
this bias.  
 
But the misreading also stems from the author’s uncritical agreement with the 
colonial government’s imposition of the Western concept of the ‘nation’ on the 
Chinese community in Sarawak. The Western notion of the ‘nation’ as a political 
community of people conscious of their common territorial boundaries, culture, 
language and historical experience was produced by the historical contingency of the 
rise of the competitive state system and capitalism in sixteenth century Europe. The 
post-World War Two colonial policy of nation-building in Sarawak was premised on 
an education system that would produce this ‘nation’ of liberal-democratic English-
speaking citizens among the diverse groups of people.46 Chinese educationists and 
left-wing leaders, however, argued for the right of each community to retain its minzu 
(民族) education. From the vantage point of state power, the Chinese refusal to 
assimilate into a common culture was easily perceived as a form of cultural or even 
racial chauvinism. This is reflected in contemporary writers’ translation of the 
Chinese term minzu as either ‘national’ or ‘racial’. For example, both Tim Hardy and 
Justus van der Kroef quote the same communist document on education, which claims 
that ‘the Conversion Plan seriously conflicts with racial concepts of the Chinese 
people’.47 In another instance, the minzu work department in the Sarawak Liberation 
League was translated as the ‘racial work’ department.48 In the western conception of 
                                                 
45 Justus van der Kroef, ‘Communism and Chinese Communalism in Sarawak’ in The China Quarterly, 
no. 20 (Oct. – Dec., 1964), pp. 38-66. 
46 Ooi Keat Gin, World Beyond the Rivers: Education in Sarawak from Brooke Rule to Colonial Office 
Administration 1841-1963 (Hull: Department of South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull, 1996), p. 
111. 
47 Van der Kroef, ‘Communism and Chinese Communalism’, p. 57, quoted from North Borneo News 
and Sabah Times, 4.12.1962; Hardy, Danger Within, p. 24. 
48 Hardy, Danger Within, p. 6. 
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the nation, this would imply the adoption of one culture to the exclusion of others 
within a political community. Did minzu, as the communists used it, carry the same 
connotation of racial superiority and cultural exclusivity as contemporary writers 
seem to have implied? 
 
Given the vehemence of the Chinese resistance to linguistic assimilation, it 
may seem specious to suggest otherwise. However, historian Tan Liok Ee has argued 
that the use of minzu as a concept of community by the Chinese educationists in 
Malaya in the 1950s was based on the ‘conception of equal [component] minzu, in the 
plural, within a single nation [guojia, 国家]’.49 To be sure, Tan admits, the ‘emphasis 
on culture was due, in part, to the special pride of belonging to an ancient and glorious 
culture’.50  But the principle of parity among the three component minzu (Malay, 
Indian and Chinese) was far from an expedient disguise for feelings of racial 
superiority among the Chinese. Rather, as Tan demonstrates, it had a well-established 
precedent in modern Chinese political thought, which the Chinese in Malaya adapted 
to their situation. Faced with the reality of a multi-ethnic state, modern Chinese 
thinkers quickly abandoned Han ethnie as the legitimizing criterion for the 
constitution of the Chinese nation after the success of the anti-Manchu 1911 
revolution. Tan argues that the notion of minzu, which the Malayan Chinese inherited, 
implied first the ‘dominance of Chinese culturalism rather than ethnic Han 
chauvinism’; and second, ‘a concept of cultural community … systemically 
distinguished from guojia as nation in a territorial and political sense’.51  
 
A central thesis of this work is to restore to minzu its authentic intellectual 
meaning within Sarawak communist thought. To the Chinese-educated in Sarawak, 
translating minzu as race, nation or community will not convey the full sense of its 
meaning. Instead, minzu is best understood as the conception of discrete cultural 
communities subsumed equitably under the nation. As mentioned above, the 
Chinese in post-war Sarawak were still rife with speech-group, occupational and class 
divisions. One of the first aims of the left-wing intelligentsia and young radicals after 
                                                 
49 Tan Liok Ee, ‘The Rhetoric of Bangsa and Minzu: Community and Nation in Tension, the Malay 
Peninsula, 1900-1955’, Working Paper 52, The Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 
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50 Ibid., p. 40. 
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the war was to forge a minzu among the Chinese in Sarawak through creating new 
socio-political institutions that cut across those divisions. Their efforts in building a 
Chinese minzu in the early post-war years are discussed in Chapter Two. But I argue, 
in Chapter Four, that it was only after August 1956, with the publication of the 
communist-controlled newspaper Sin Wen Pau that the notion of the Sarawak nation 
as a tripartite minzu alliance of the Chinese, Malay and Dayak peoples began to 
emerge in communist rhetoric. The circulation of the newspaper, as Benedict 
Anderson contends, helped to create the ‘imagined community’ of the Sarawak 
Chinese minzu-nation. Chapter Four argues that the spread of this minzu-nationalist 
idea between 1956 and 1959 prepared the ground for a mass movement, which 
explains the rapid mobilization of the Chinese grassroots when the Sarawak United 
People’s Party (SUPP) branches expanded across the country between 1959 and 1961. 
Minzu served to unite the Chinese community towards the nation of Sarawak peoples; 
it explains why Sarawak’s native peoples made up almost half of SUPP’s early 
membership.52 
 
 Communist organisation and minzu-nationalism, rather than communalism, 
combine to mobilise a formidable opposition to the colonial government in the latter 
half of the period under study. Due to the clandestine nature of the movement, Hardy 
and Van der Kroef were, however, unable to say much about the personalities and 
politics behind Sarawak communist leadership and how they influenced the course of 
events. Douglas Hyde’s The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare and Vernon Porritt’s recent 
monograph on Sarawak communism shed more light on communist leadership but the 
former’s reliance on mainly colonial intelligence sources and the latter on additional 
open English-language sources necessarily obscure the personalities and their roles 
behind the movement.53  
 
To analyse how the Sarawak communist leadership influenced the course of 
historical events, it is imperative to lay out the patterns of leadership over the period. 
Between 1949 and 1953, radical left were split between the China and Sarawak-
oriented factions. The latter emerged in 1953 to form the SLL, whose leadership was 
                                                 
52 See Chapter 4.3. Interestingly, the use of the word zhongzu (race), as far as I can trace it, only began 
to creep into Sarawak leftist discourse in the period 1960-61. See Min Chong Pao on 18.1.1961. 
53 Douglas Hyde, The roots of guerrilla warfare (London, Sydney: Bodley Head, 1968); Vernon Porritt, 
The Rise and Fall of Communism in Sarawak, 1940-1990 (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 2004). 
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guided by the communist theory of democratic-centralisation – ‘the minority obedient 
to the majority, the subordinate obedient to the superior, the individual obedient to the 
collective body, the sections obedient to the central authorities’. 54  A central 
committee of sorts existed throughout the period. This was expanded from a 
duumvirate at the founding of SLL July 1953 to a six-person committee by 1957. 
Chapter Three discusses how this communist leadership emerged through the conduct 
of two student strikes in the Kuching Chung Hwa Middle School in 1951 and 1955. 
Chapter 4.1 shows that there was a clear two-tier division of labour between this six-
person communist leadership, i.e. each member was put in charge of a particular 
branch of the ‘united front’ [trade unions, peasant association, student movement, 
minzu works, the political party] and the work of one of Sarawak’s five administrative 
divisions [North Borneo formed the sixth administrative division]. While the six 
people formed a central committee in theory, even the leadership of this committee 
turned out to be highly personal and hierarchical. In practice, there was no routine 
meeting of the committee to discuss major policy issues. 55  Events proved that 
leadership at the centre and at the top invariably prevailed over the majority and the 
collective.  
 
1.5 Sources and Methodology  
 
 The foremost challenge involved in writing the history of a clandestine 
movement is the paucity of written sources, and in the Sarawak case, their control by 
the government. Yet historians relish such challenges. In this work, I have made use 
of three sets of sources to address some of the historiographical gaps identified in the 
previous section. The first consists of colonial records. These include the official 
Colonial Office correspondence stored at the Public Records Office in London, 
personal papers of ex-colonial officials deposited with the Rhodes House Library, 
Oxford and the School of Oriental and African Studies, London and the Sarawak 
colonial government’s published annual reports and censuses. While the narrative 
draws extensively from one particular set of monthly ‘Sarawak and Brunei Political 
Intelligence Reports’ (1948-1956), these sources are not used without discrimination. 
I am aware that much that goes into these reports, in the nature of all intelligence 
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work, is politically biased. Hence, I have only quoted from them either if the 
information corroborates with other third-party sources or if they generally fall in line 
with the logic of contiguous events. By and large, the local intelligence committee did 
get its assessments correct.  
 
The second set is a wide variety of Chinese languages sources, which are of 
varying standards of reliability. For the earlier period (1945-1952), the mining of 
contemporary Chinese newspapers in Singapore and Sarawak have produced some 
nuggets of key information about the nature of Chinese society in Sarawak during 
those years. A set of left-wing newspapers, political party and trade unions 
publications are available, but as all open sources of the time go, they hardly reveal 
the calculations of SLL’s top leaders within their inner chambers. Nonetheless, upon 
closer reading of the editorials, many of them written by Wen Ming Chyuan, editor of 
Sin Wen Pau and the Education and Propaganda Secretary of SUPP, reveal that the 
top leader’s broad strategy was often conveyed through these open publications, albeit 
in much dress-downed Communist language. Memoirs of former activists have also 
started to roll off the press in recent years and they have been useful for providing 
personal insights into the events of the time. For instance, the memoirs of Chan Siaw 
Hee, a militant leftist who was not a member of SLL, reveals a lot that is previously 
unknown about his ex-colleagues and adversaries.56 The Sibu Friendship Association, 
a social club for ex-Communist comrades, has published a series of booklets, in which 
remnant documents and oral histories are recorded. Finally, Sarawak International 
Times (SIT) feature writer Li Zhenyuan published a series of sixty-three articles about 
Sarawak politics during its times of crisis between June and September 2006. Though 
written without scholarly apparatus, these articles have proved highly informative to 
this exercise. Unlike other scholarly works which are based predominantly on English 
language sources, the use of Chinese language sources restores authenticity to the 
voice of the protagonists of the history. 
 
The final and most valuable set of sources is a series of twenty-four oral 
interviews granted to me by the former leaders of SLL and its satellite the SAYA. 
These interviews were conducted between January and March 2007. To protect the 
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privacy of the informants and to ensure the accuracy of the recording, I have offered 
to produce transcripts, which all the interviewees have read, amended and approved 
for my use in this thesis. They include two of the five surviving members of the 
Central Committee and the Sibu and Miri chiefs of SLL. I have cited the transcripts as 
critically as I have used the colonial sources. Three interviewees have elected to 
remain semi-anonymous: they are cited as Mr. Khoo, Mr. Ho and Mr Lin in the text. 
Although tempered by the distance of time, the broad outlines and the decisive 
moments of their political careers remain vivid in their memories. They are tapped for 




The Making of a Revolutionary Generation 
 
 In this chapter, I explore the causes that led to the creation of a generation of 
revolutionary-minded Chinese youth in Sarawak. While most scholars have focussed 
on the issue of organised political indoctrination of the left-wing Chinese 
intelligentsia through an organisation known as the Anti-Fascist League,1 I argue that 
it is not so much their direct contact with the youth but their efforts in publishing and 
education that left behind a far larger legacy. These two social transformations, the 
rise of literacy rates and the increasing flow and availability of left-wing literature, 
made the radicalisation of Chinese youth almost inevitable. The point of no return was 
reached in 1949 when Communism prevailed in China. It became the template on 
which their vision of a Communist utopia could and should be attained.  
 
2.1 The left-wing Chinese intelligentsia and the challenge to ‘towkay leadership’ 
 
The migration of educated Chinese political exiles was one of the most 
important ways by which the new progressive ideas of socialism and democracy were 
transmitted to the Chinese in Sarawak. Migration to the Nanyang (literally, the South 
Seas) to escape political persecution was a modern phenomenon that began with the 
flight of the reformist Kang Yuwei and revolutionary Sun Yat-sen to the Nanyang at 
the turn of the twentieth century. Communism took root in Chinese politics after 1919 
and the first wave of left-wing political exiles to the Nanyang began in earnest with 
the collapse of the first Kuomintang (KMT) – Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
United Front in 1927, culminating in the formation of the CCP’s Nanyang Provisional 
Committee in Singapore in the same year. Since these political refugees were usually 
better educated than their fellow Chinese labourer/merchant sojourners, they tended to 
gravitate towards occupations that required these qualifications – politicians, teachers, 
journalists and booksellers. Until the outbreak of the Second World War, the majority 
of these Nanyang intelligentsia behaved politically just as they did back in China. 
When Japan invaded China in 1937, the intelligentsia were highly successful in 
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mobilising the resources and emotions of the Southeast Asian Chinese to the cause of 
defending the Chinese nation.  
 
In 1937, Wu Chan (伍禅) would be one of the most learned Chinese exiles of 
his time to arrive in Sarawak. Born in Lufeng County, Guangdong Province in 1904, 
he attended the Tokyo Higher Normal School in Japan at the age of twenty-two. 
When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Wu Chan quit his studies and moved to 
Fujian Province to teach. At Quanzhou, Wu Chan was acquainted with the famous 
New Literature writer Ba Jin (巴金), with whom he co-founded the ‘Cultural Life 
Publishing House’ (文化生活出版社) in Shanghai in 1936. Wu Chan moved among 
the left-wing circles in Shanghai and was once picked up by the French police for 
being a ‘Communist suspect’. After the Marco Polo Bridge incident in July 1937, Wu 
Chan fled Shanghai to join his parents and maternal relatives in Siniawan, Sarawak, 
where they owned several shop-houses. Once settled, Wu Chan became the principal 
of the Hwa Chiau School and the Chairman of the China Relief Fund branch at Bau, a 
gold-mining town sixteen miles southwest of Kuching on the Sarawak River’s right-
hand branch. Wu Chan would take his expertise and networks in the publishing and 
education world to Kuching at the end of the war.2 
 
Another intelligentsia-in-exile who would play a pivotal role in the 
transmission of new ideas was Chin Shaw Tung (陈绍唐). Born in 1916 in Jiexi 
County, Guangdong Province, Chin was exposed to Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary ideas 
from young. After graduating from the Guangdong Lingnan University (广东岭南大
学), he returned to his hometown to teach. During the Sino-Japanese War, he was 
active in a local left-wing resistance outfit, the Lingdong Youth Anti-Enemy 
Comrades’ Association (岭东青年抗敌同志会). In the autumn of 1940, when the 
KMT began to suppress local left-wing organisations, he decided to flee to Sarawak, 
where a few of his cousins had already migrated. With the aid of a relative, he slipped 
out of KMT-controlled Swatow and moved to Kuching, arriving in 1941. Joining his 
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cousins further up the Sarawak River, he became a shop assistant at Bau. An avid 
student of history, he devoted his spare time during the Japanese Occupation (1941-
1945) to research the history of the Bau gold-miners’ 1857 Rebellion against the 
Brooke regime.3 He would run a bookstore and a grocery store in Kuching after 1945. 
 
 While the majority of the Chinese merchant leaders in Sarawak campaigned 
hard to boycott Japanese goods and to raise funds for the China Relief Fund, only the 
left-wing intelligentsia felt sufficiently motivated to organise resistance after the 
Japanese occupied Sarawak in January 1942.4 In 1941, Wu Chan and Chin Shaw 
Tung founded the Sarawak Anti-Fascist League, which had active adherents in the 
Chinese settlements on the Sarawak River and in Kuching.5  Anti-Fascist League 
leaders were in large part Chinese school teachers such as Lee Shu Foon (李树芬) and 
Tan Sze Min (陈士民), who taught at Bau and Siniawan, and He Hemin (何和民) in 
Kuching.6 Owing perhaps to the lack of arms, the Anti-Fascist League limited its 
activities to mitigating the material privations inflicted on the locals by the war. It also 
maintained contact with supplied food and fabric replenishments to the Pontianak-
based West Borneo Anti-Japanese League, whose botched plans for armed uprising 
triggered a massacre of more than 130 Chinese merchants from June to August 1944.7 
Supplies had been obtained through a profitable rice-monopoly license Wu Chan had 
fortuitously been granted by his former classmate in Tokyo, now a general with the 
Japanese army in Kuching. 8  Towards the end of the war, Anti-Fascist League 
members in Kuching were plotting to assassinate Japanese soldiers when the abrupt 
end to the Pacific War in August 1945 intervened.9  
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The combination of their left-wing beliefs and a sense of moral superiority 
over former community leaders who had ‘collaborated’ with the Japanese made the 
left-wing Chinese intelligentsia head a brief challenge for the leadership of the 
Chinese community after the war. The Brookes, like the Dutch and British colonisers, 
had appointed wealthy local Chinese merchants as ‘Kapitans’ China to represent the 
Chinese migrants’ interests and act as the intermediary between the government and 
the Chinese. The wealth and power of these ‘Kapitans’ were in turn reinforced 
through the colonial governments’ granting of lucrative gambling, opium and spirits 
licences and tax revenue farms.10 During the interregnum, spontaneous instances of 
mob violence against these ‘running dogs’ took place across the country until the 
Australian military administration re-installed order in September 1945. The British 
colonial government then granted clemency to all collaborators in Southeast Asia in 
March 1945.11 Yet the depth of popular despise for ‘collaborators’ and especially 
those who were re-installed to positions of power and privilege was still palpable four 
years later, as evidenced by the following testimony given by Dr. T’ien Ju-Kang, a 
visiting Colonial Social Science Research Council researcher in 1950: 
 
(Q)uite a large number of those men whom the Sarawak Chinese had 
been used to regard as pillars of their society turned out to be 
collaborators...The present “leaders” are like those small celluloid dolls 
with leaden feet: even such great events as the Japanese Occupation 
and the subsequent liberation could not turn them down. Within the 
existing system they are adaptable to any external political situation. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that they should be staunch opponents of 
any fundamental change in local Chinese organization.12 
 
 The call for radical change to the social and political order among Sarawak 
Chinese was initiated through the Overseas Chinese Youth Associations (华侨青年社, 
henceforth OCYA). Chin Shaw Tung founded Sarawak’s first OCYA in Bau in 
1943.13 After Kuching’s liberation in September 1945, both Chin and Wu Chan, who 
had moved to Kuching by then, were instrumental in starting the Kuching OCYA 
                                                 
10 Craig Lockard, ‘Leadership and Power within the Chinese Community of Sarawak: A Historical 
Survey’ in Journal of South-East Asia Studies, II: 2, Sept, 1971, pp. 195-217. 
11 Reece, Masa Jepun, pp. 219-228. 
12 T’ien Ju-K’ang, The Chinese of Sarawak: A Study of Social Structure (Kuching: SUPP Headquarters, 
Research and Resource Centre, 1997), pp. 118 and 121.  
13 Chan, A Memoir, p. 113. 
 24
from ‘behind-the-scenes’. 14  OCYAs mushroomed throughout Sarawak during and 
after the war. OCYAs, in providing reading materials and cultural activities for the 
youth, were possibly at first designed by the Chinese intelligentsia as a stop-gap 
measure to alleviate the rising numbers of over-aged and under-educated Chinese 
youth – a result of the closure of Chinese schools during the war. Yet once the youth 
gathered under the OCYA banner, it quickly gained its own life and raison d’etre. In a 
1951 secret memo on ‘Chinese affairs’, a District Officer, J.R. Outram reported: 
 
As events in China developed in favour of the Communists, so these 
Youth Associations became tinged more and more deeply pink, until 
with the establishment and recognition of the People’s Government in 
1949/50 they attained the position of leaders of the overseas Chinese in 
the celebrations attendant thereon. They are now the liaison between 
the People’s Government through Communist Associations in Hong 
Kong and Singapore and the Sarawak Chinese.15 
 
Soon after its founding, the Kuching OCYA challenged the legitimacy of the 
traditional Chinese leaders to represent the Chinese community in the ‘cession’ 
controversy – Charles Vyner Brooke’s proposed ‘sale’ of Sarawak to the British 
government in the spring of 1946. The Chairman of the Kuching OCYA, Lim Kong 
Gan (林光彦 ), served as one of the most vocal spokesperson for the Chinese 
community during the ensuing public debates. In a meeting held on 27 January 1946, 
OCYA passed four resolutions. The first two struck down the pro-Cession 
representations of the Kapitan-General Ong Tiang Swee and other merchant leaders 
and questioned their right to speak for all Sarawak Chinese. The other two aimed: 
 
iii)  to establish an ‘Overseas Chinese Committee for the Promotion 
of Democratic Politics’; and 
iv)  to organise a supreme authority for the Sarawak Chinese.16   
 
OCYA protests failed to obstruct the cession of Sarawak to the British Empire. 
Neither did its call for democratic politics and a supreme authority for the Sarawak 
                                                 
14 Li Zhenyuan, ‘A True Rendition of the Stormy Times (31): Cession Crisis (4)’ in SIT, 19.8.2006. 
This SIT feature writer published from June to September 2006 sixty-three articles on the history of 
Sarawak in its times of crises under the series titled Feng Bao Shi Lu (A True Rendition of the Stormy 
Times). All sixty-three articles can be accessed at www.intimes.com.my/write-html/write-mulu.htm.  
15 The National Archives (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO), Colonial Office (CO) 537/7358: 
‘Report on a Tour of Sarawak’, 13.3.1951. 
16 Overseas Chinese Daily News, 6.2.1946. Quoted in Reece, Name of Brooke, p. 207. 
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Chinese bear any concrete effect. Wu Chan had a hand in its organisation though he 
eventually remained in the background. In September 1945, Wu Chan approached 
Jian Changbo (简长伯), the pre-war Chairman of the China Relief Fund (Kuching 
branch), for assistance. Jian then called on all Chinese dialect and voluntary 
associations in Kuching to nominate their representatives, amongst whom the 
candidates elected Lim Kong Gan chairman. The Chung Hwa Association (古晋中华
公会, henceforth, CHA) was then officially registered on the same day as the colonial 
government was installed: 1 July 1946.17 In the two years of its existence, the CHA 
harboured pretensions to be the ‘supreme authority’ among the Sarawak Chinese on 
the simple premise that all Chinese dialect and clan bodies were among its constituent 
members.  
 
Yet two developments quickly ensued to undercut the CHA’s political 
authority, ensuring its demise by 1948. First, the British colonial government quickly 
restored the traditional system of ‘indirect rule’ through the Secretariat of Chinese 
Affairs. This office was headed by a Hokkien-speaking colonial officer, who dealt 
with all aspects Chinese governance from the control of Chinese immigration and 
labour to the adjudication of Chinese traditional law in the colonial civil court. Some 
rudimentary element of democracy was injected into the ‘Kapitan’ system when it 
was resurrected after the war. At the village level, male heads of households would 
now elect a Kapitan every three years.18 In larger settlements or in towns, where there 
were mixed dialect groups, the individual dialect associations elected their own 
representatives to ‘Chinese Advisory Boards’, on which the local District Officer sat 
as the chairman. Dr. T’ien’s survey of the Sarawak Chinese indicated that the 
essential pre-war political-economic features of colonial society had been all but 
restored. His study found Chinese dialects and clans to be highly deterministic in the 
individual’s wealth, power, and economic function in society. He cited in particular 
the case of the Teochew and Hokkien community, whose kinship connections with 
the Singapore entrepot market, ensured their dominance in the lucrative grocery and 
rubber trade. This contrasted with the plight of the rural Hakkas, who were for the 
most part peasants in the outlying regions of Kuching, struggling to make ends meet. 
                                                 
17 Li, ‘Cession Crisis (4)’. 
18 ‘Report on a Tour of Sarawak’, 13.3.1951. 
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Dr. T’ien was also highly critical of the façade of colonial democracy in the ‘Chinese 
Advisory Board’ system. He found: 
 
(a)t one Association meeting a young Chinese made an impassioned 
speech concerning the welfare of the Association members. The 
chairman, a wealthy towkay, grew impatient. Suddenly he interrupted 
the young speaker: “How many rubber estates do you own?” The 
young answered none. “In that case,” said the Chairman, with a sigh, 
“since you have nothing to contribute when the subscription list comes 
round, you had better cut your speech short”.19 
 
Then in 1948, the Kuomintang (KMT) government set up a Chinese consulate 
in Kuching, which made claims to representing all Chinese in Sarawak. This move 
was in turn much lauded by the Chinese merchants, who set up an endowment fund 
for the construction of the consulate.20 The impact of the arrival of the KMT Chinese 
consul on local society was to further reinforce the power of the local merchants and 
to increase the stature of the KMT among the Chinese in Sarawak at the expense of 
the left-wing Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese intelligentsia’s first bid for local 
power hence ended in 1948 with the closure of the CHA. Henceforth, they would 
channel their efforts to radically change the social and economic structure of Sarawak 
Chinese society through their daily contact with the young. 
 
 
2.2. Education and Literacy 
 
Chinese schools were private institutions, run and financed by voluntary 
Chinese businessmen, shopkeepers and village leaders, and in a few cases, 
missionaries with minimal intervention and assistance from the colonial state. Until 
1956, Chinese schools in Sarawak, like elsewhere in Southeast Asia, were 
administered by voluntary Boards of Management, which were elected by the local 
community and financed mainly by fees and private donations. In 1953 for example, 
the government expenditure per pupil was $50 to $60 in government schools, $6 in 
private schools, $14 in Mission schools, and $2 in Chinese schools. An average 
                                                 
19 T’ien, Chinese of Sarawak, p. 115. 
20 Lau Tzy Cheng, The History of the Chinese Consulate in North Borneo (Sibu: Sarawak Chinese 
Cultural Association, 2000). The Consulate closed in January 1950 after Britain established diplomatic 
ties with Communist China. 
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Chinese primary school in Kuching received 6% of its annual expenditure from 
government grants, the other 94% had to be met through fees and donation.21 In 1936, 
one in five Sarawak Chinese who entered a Chinese primary school could expect to 
graduate from it six years later. Three in a hundred made it through three more years 
of junior middle school. For the forty-six students who graduated from junior middle 
school that year, those who chose to further their studies in the Chinese language 
stream would have had to do so in Singapore.22 Education for the Chinese underwent 
significant changes during the post-war era. In this section, I examine the extent of 
these changes. 
 
 The end of the war heralded a period of unprecedented expansion and 
development for Sarawak Chinese schools. Across Sarawak, local Chinese 
community leaders resumed pre-war primary schools immediately after the war. 
18,222 pupils were enrolled in 178 Chinese Primary Schools in 1946, compared with 
13,416 in 1941 and 7189 in 1936. Seven years later, the figure had increased by 
almost ten thousand, together with the addition of sixty schools. 23  This rapid 
expansion in the primary school student population translated into a rising demand for 
higher education in the early 1950s. A three-year junior middle school education 
became a common aspiration for the urban youth in Kuching, Sibu and Miri. In 1951, 
the creation of a senior middle department24 made available for the first time in 
Kuching the standard twelve-year (six-three-three) Chinese education system. 
Students from Sibu, Miri and as far as Brunei travelled to Kuching to the CHMS, 
which became the premier institute for Chinese education throughout Sarawak.25 The 
Kuching CHMS’s enrolment expanded tenfold over the next decade from more than 
two hundred in 1946 to seven hundred in 1952, eleven hundred in 1954 and over two 
thousand in 1957.26 Nine in ten Chung Hua Primary School graduates furthered their 
                                                 
21 See E. W. Woodhead, Report upon Financing of Education and Conditions of Service in the 
Teaching Profession in Sarawak (Kuching: Sarawak Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 12 and 59. 
22 These estimates are calculated based on the assumption that a constant number of students enrolled 
during the previous nine years. See TNA: PRO CO 1045/493: R.W. Hammond, Report on Education in 
Sarawak, 1937, Appendix II. 
23 Woodhead, Report upon Financing of Education, pp. 43 and 47. 1936 figures are derived from 
Hammond, Report on Education, Appendix II. 
24 Liu Pak Khui, Twenty Years of Teaching: Twenty Years in Chung Hwa Middle School (Singapore: 
The South Seas Society, 1984) p. 94. 
25 Chan, A Memoir, p. 64.  
26 Liu, Twenty Years, pp. 85-93. 
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studies in the middle school.27 In Sibu, at least five Chinese middle schools operating 
before the war were re-opened within a year of liberation.28 On the fringes of the 
cities, peasants surviving on market gardening also began to clamour for educational 
facilities beyond the primary level. Guong Ming Middle School (光民中学) at Sungai 
Bidut, about fifteen kilometres outside Sibu, was one of at least four middle schools 
established in the early 1950s to meet this demand.29 By 1953, students enrolled in 
Chinese secondary schools outnumbered English Missionary and Malay Government 
schools by a ratio of twenty-seven to ten and one respectively.30 
  
Rapid expansion in education facilities was complemented by unity on an 
unprecedented degree among the Chinese educationists. A convention of seventeen 
local Chinese intelligentsia of all political persuasions and dialect groups gathered on 
17 October 1945 to form the Chung Hwa Education Society (中华教育会, CHES) to 
discuss the future of Chinese education. Former colonial education inspectors Hsu 
Yaw Tong (徐耀东) and Ban Tao Kui (万道奎) had convened the CHES, which 
included at least four members of the Anti-Fascist League: Wu Chan, Lin Lixin (林立
信), Wu Xiaoyuan (吴小园) and Tan Sze Min.31 The meeting elected Wu Chan 
Chairman. Before the war, nine separate dialect schools were run by their respective 
dialect associations principally for their own communities. At this historic meeting, it 
was decided to resolve dialect parochialism among the Chinese by mixing all Chinese 
in one school system, under the banner of ‘Unity in Organisation, Unity in 
Management’ (统筹统办 ). The use of dialects as the media for teaching and 
communication was replaced by Guoyu (National Language, i.e. Mandarin). Five 
Chung Hwa primary schools and the Chung Hwa middle school would now be jointly 
managed by the newly established Kuching Chung Hwa Schools Board of 
Management, which would draw its directors from the various dialect associations. 
                                                 
27 Chan, A Memoir, p. 64. 
28 Chung Hua (中华, established 1936), Tung Hua (敦化, 1934), Chung Hin (中兴, 1938), Kwang Hua 
(光华, 1926), Chung Cheng (中正, 1934). See Huang Zhaofa, A Tumultous Century of Chinese 
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30 Woodhead, Report upon Financing of Education, p. 7. 
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Mr. Lin, 1.2.2007. 
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The result of this massive expansion of the number of Chinese primary 
schools was such that when a Sarawak nationalist discourse began to emerge in the 
later half of the 1950s, the most common language of literacy among the people of 
Sarawak was Chinese (69,572 out of a total literate population of 124,420), followed 
by English (48,379) and Malay (34,399). Literacy was also much more prevalent 
among the young amongst the Chinese. In 1960, the number of teenagers who could 
read and write in the Chinese language outnumbered the number of Chinese literate 
adults (aged 30-39 years) by four to one (32,281 to 8,799).32 Concurrent with this rise 
in rates of literacy among the young was their demand for reading material. What did 
the youths of the period read?  
 
2.3 Literature and Revolution 
 
 The school texts that shaped the fundamental worldview of the post-war 
middle school generation were essentially China-oriented. Students in Sarawak 
Chinese schools learnt from the same set of textbooks that were used in pre-war 
Republican China, albeit adapted for use in British Malaya. Of the five major 
publishers of Chinese textbooks – the Commercial Press, Chung Hua Book Company, 
World Book Company, and Nanyang Book Company – all but the last were based in 
Shanghai, though all had branches in Singapore from between 1916 and 1926.33 
According to an independent survey of Chinese education in British Malaya in 1951, 
of the History and Geography textbooks, ‘fifty per cent of contents [were] devoted to 
China, 25 per cent. to Overseas Chinese and places and events related to China; only 
25 per cent to rest of world [sic], including Malaya’, while the Civics textbook 
suffered from the ‘chief lack [of] emphasis on communal and racial co-operation’.34 
                                                 
32 L.W. Jones., Sarawak: A Report on the 1960 Population Census (Kuching: Sarawak Government 
Printing Office), pp. 27, 47 and 81. 
33 Yap Wee Cheng, ‘Publication of Chinese-School Textbooks in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia’ 
in A Historical Survey of Chinese-School Textbooks in Singapore Malaysia, and Indonesia, Yeap 
Chong Leng and Wee Tong Bao (eds.), (Singapore: Chinese Heritage Centre, 2005), pp. 53-65. 
34 William P. Fenn and Wu Teh-yao, Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans: The 
Report of a Mission invited by the Federation Government to study the problem of the Education of 
Chinese in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), pp. 19-21. Tom Cromwell, Sarawak’s 
Secretary of Chinese affairs, and Hugh Earnshaw, Sarawak’s Director of Education observed and 
participated in the presentation of Fenn and Wu’s findings, held in Singapore. See, Fenn and Wu, 
Education of Chinese Malayans, p. 1 and London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS): GB 
102 PP MS 33, Box 7 File 29: Cromwell to parents, 26.5.1951. 
 30
School texts anchored the Chinese middle school student in Chinese history and 
geography, but ultimately it was the literature lessons that gave them a civilisational 
outlook. A junior middle three student reading The Selected Chinese Works Volume V
（中华文选）would be exposed to the full gamut of Chinese literary genres: from 
anti-feudal May Fourth novelettes, romantic Tang poems, melancholic Song verses to 
classical historical treatises on ancient Chinese civil wars.35  
 
 While school texts instilled in the youths a civilisational mooring, newspapers, 
literary journals, novels in turn shaped their political views of the contemporary world. 
Communist-inspired newspapers were readily available in Kuching and Sibu during 
the period 1945-1951. In fact they were produced by the left-wing Chinese 
intelligentsia, most of whom held concurrent teaching positions in the Chung Hwa 
schools. In Kuching, it was the Wu Chan-led intelligentsia class who spearheaded the 
editorial of the left-wing Chung Hwa Journal (CHJ), published from November 1945 
to April 1951, while the Overseas Chinese Daily News and Modern Critic represented 
right-wing views. The CHJ was produced by the Wu Chan-led intelligentsia, Ih Yee-
wu (易艺伍) and Wu Xiaoyuan, who were both teachers at the Kuching CHMS. In 
Sibu, Chiau Sheng Pau (CSP), published from August 1950 to August 1951, and 
edited by Song Liangzan (宋凉赞) and Xu Laifu (许来夫), both teachers at the Sibu 
CHMS, was pitted against the right-wing See Hua Daily. In its inaugural editorial, 
Chiau Sheng Pau declared that one important task the paper faced was to ‘foster 
culture’ among the masses. This it did in the section ‘Culture Palace’, in which a 
writer argued the case for the ‘spread of scientific knowledge to the masses, so as to 
break up superstitious beliefs’. A full page dedicated to an article by Ih Yee-wu 
indicated its fraternal connection.36 British intelligence noted that the ‘Chiau Sheng 
[sic.] newspaper of Sibu reproduces after about ten days the same blocks as the CHJ 
of Kuching’.37  
 
Yet the young were not limited to the left-wing publications of the local scene. 
Singapore newspapers of all genres were distributed widely across the major Sarawak 
                                                 
35 Song Han Wen, The Selected Chinese Works Volume V (Singapore, Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book 
Company, 1968). 
36 Chiau Sheng Pau, 9.8.1950. 
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cities. Two of the most popular left-wing publications in Kuching during the early 
post-war period were Nan Chiau Jit Poh and Feng Hsia¸38 both edited by Hu Yu-Chih 
(胡愈之), an underground CCP member and Chairman of the China Democratic 
League, Malaya Branch (based in Singapore). Feng Hsia in particular was a weekly 
journal targeted at Chinese youth scattered across Southeast Asia. In his memoir, Hu 
recalls the ideological motivation behind his editorial policy: 
 
After two major wars, the tide of global democracy and freedom rose 
high, the ‘countries below the winds’ no longer desired to be 
dominated and enslaved by the West. In Java, Vietnam, Burma, and 
Calcutta, calls for ‘war’ were sounded everywhere…How should one 
comprehend these ‘countries below the winds’, how should one listen 
to the cries of their exploited and enslaved peoples, reflect their hopes 
and demands, such were the wishes of the founders of Feng Hsia. 
Hence, we named our little publication Feng Hsia to complement the 
national liberation struggles that were erupting like volcanoes in the 
‘countries below the winds’, uphold peace and harmony in the Far East, 
within which included China’s domestic struggle for Democracy, 
Peace, and Unity.39 
  
A second generation of local-oriented Singapore left-wing literary publications, which 
began to emerge from 1954, was also widely read among Sarawak’s youth. The two 
most popular were Huangdi (荒地 , literally Barren Land) and Gengyun (耕耘 , 
Cultivation). 40  Another popular source of progressive literature was the CCP-
sponsored presses and publishers based in Hong Kong. With a small delivery fee, 
many Chinese youth managed to subscribe to Communist newspapers such as Ta 
Kung Pao (大公报) and Wen Hui Bao (文汇报) and novelettes and political treatises 
published by the Joint Publishing Company (三联书局) and New Democracy Book 
Company (新民主主义书局) in Hong Kong.41 
 
 The youth’s initiation into the world of revolution often began with reading 
cartoons or novels depicting the life-stories of Communist heroes and martyrs. Two of 
the most popular Chinese martyr figures were Liu Hulan (刘胡兰) and Dong Cunrui 
(董存瑞), both of whom were young Chinese Communist soldiers who sacrificed 
                                                 
38 Interview with Mr. Khoo, 12.5.2006.  
39 Hu Yu-chih and Shen Zi Jiu, Exile on the Equator (Beijing: Joint Publishing Company, 1985), p. 109. 
40 Most informants mentioned these two titles in the interviews.  
41 Interviews with Tan Lee Seng, 27.2.2007; and Mr. Khoo, 11.1.2007. 
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their lives for the causes of patriotism and communism in the Anti-Japanese resistance 
war and the Korean War. But by far the most influential fictional hero was the 
Russian revolutionary protagonist in How The Steel Was Tempered.42 Most of the 
interviewees can still recite this passage in the novel: 
 
Life is the most valuable object for mankind. Everyone has only one 
go at it. A man should live his life in this way: Looking back, he 
should not regret having squandered his time, nor should he feel 
shameful for having been vulgar and despicable. On his deathbed, he 
will be able to say, “My entire life and all my energies have been 
devoted to the most spectacular mission in the world – to struggle for 
the liberation of all mankind.”43 
  
 Having been persuaded to the revolutionary cause through the emotional 
appeal of the fictional characters, Sarawak’s youth became motivated to discover the 
ideology behind such fervour. At this stage, many of them eagerly sought or were 
introduced to Communist primers Historical Materialism and the Development of 
Society and Masses’ Philosophies, through which they mastered basic Marxist 
theories. Take Tan Lee Seng’s case. He was raised in a shop-house along Courthouse 
Road in the Kuching bazaar. From young, he was exposed to the KMT-sponsored 
Chung Xing Daily News (中兴日报), which his elders read in the shop. In his final 
year at the Chung Hwa Primary School (No. 4) in 1949, one of his classmates passed 
him some cartoons, which depicted the life-stories of revolutionary heroes in China’s 
War of Resistance. From there, Tan joined his friends in a study cell, where he began 
to delve into Communist theories. For him, it was when he read Historical 
Materialism and the Development of Society and Masses’ Philosophies that he 
became firmly entrenched in his revolutionary belief.44 The argument was rational and 
scientific: man had evolved from primate, from slavish society to the feudal, from the 
agrarian society to the industrial, and finally they will transit from the capitalist to the 
socialist and communist society. It would be their life mission to bring about this last 
stage of human evolution.  
 
                                                 
42 Interview with Bong Kee Chok, 5-6.1.2007.  
43 Nikolay Ostrovsky, Tian Guo Bin (trans.), How Steel Was Tempered (Beijing: Yan Shan Publishing 
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 The influence of print-capitalism on the spread of nationalism has been 
mentioned briefly in Chapter 1.4 and will be elaborated further in Chapter 4.2. Its 
quantitative influence on the transmission of radical left-wing ideas among the young 
Chinese is more difficult to measure than its qualitative influence for the lack of 
circulation figures. Some of these publications were produced in Singapore and Hong 
Kong and made their way in small numbers to Sarawak either through direct postal 
order by individuals or by the distribution network of Chinese bookshops. The 
numbers could not have been commensurable with the local newspapers discussed in 
Chapter 4.2. Yet smaller circulation numbers need not necessarily imply lesser 
influence: newspapers, journals and books were often passed around and shared 
among friends and family. What is certain is that the growing circulation of these 
newspapers and novelettes created a community of socialist consciousness among the 
growing population of literate young Chinese. From my interviews with the twenty-
three communist veterans, the senior generation among them all claimed to have been 
shaped in their thinking by these early post-war radical publications.45  
 
2.4 The Template of New China 
 
As the CCP began to gain ground in the Chinese civil war, the idea that the 
Overseas Chinese had to adapt to the new political realities emerging in mainland 
China was first articulated by the Colonial Social Science Research Council scholar, 
Dr. T’ien Ju-K’ang, during his field trip to Sarawak from August 1948 to October 
1949. On 1 January 1949, Dr. T’ien argued in an article, ‘The Future of Nanyang 
Chinese’, published in the Chung Hwa Journal, that the six million Overseas Chinese 
in Southeast Asia had to be self-reliant while China was mired in civil war and that 
the colonial system of ruling the Chinese through appointed ‘kapitans’ was outmoded, 
so that what the Overseas Chinese needed was a ‘general organisation’ (总机构) that 
‘truly represented’ the community’s interests. 46  Following the victory of the 
Communists, Dr. T’ien, who had concluded his sojourn to Sarawak, gave a speech to 
the Association of Journalists, during which he outlined three new roles for the ‘new 
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46 Chung Hwa Journal, 1.1.1949, full article published in Fong Hon Kah and Lim Shau Hua Juliatta, A 
Patriotic Scholar of China: Professor Tien Ju-Kang (Kuching: SUPP Headquarters, Research and 
Resource Centre, 2004), pp. 132-4. 
 34
Overseas Chinese’. First, he urged the Chinese to move their capital from trading 
activities to industrial investments either in China or locally. Second, he continued to 
push for singular ‘modern’ governing bodies for Chinese communities. Finally, on 
nationalism, he dismissed Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘narrow’, ‘Han’ ethnic chauvinism and 
called on the Overseas Chinese to treat the indigenous races as equals, and to broaden 
to their horizon towards ‘internationalism’.47 
 
Dr. T’ien’s framing of the new Overseas Chinese identity gained a wide 
audience, especially among the young, during his fourteen-month stay in Sarawak. 
According to his biographer, Dr. T’ien became immensely popular among the 
Chinese in Sarawak and he was frequently invited to give speeches to Chinese schools 
and other associations. 48  A contemporary school teacher describes him as an 
‘extremely left scholar’, who ‘added oil [to fire] on the heads of the left-inclined 
people in Sarawak’. 49  Indeed, Dr. T’ien was in close contact with the Chinese 
intelligentsia network straddling the Chung Hwa Journal and the Chinese schools. His 
impact on the intelligentsia and the young Chinese was affirmed by the manager of 
Chung Hwa Journal, Tan Kheng Huat (陈庆发), who gave the following speech at his 
farewell party: 
 
Ever since Dr. T’ien came to Kuching, the thinking and learning of our 
local youths have improved tremendously. This can be attributed to Dr. 
T’ien’s teaching. Now that Dr. T’ien is leaving Kuching, it is a true 
loss to Kuching’s youth. So we hope that Dr. T’ien will have the 
chance to come back. From now on, we must encourage one another, 
work hard to learn and to enrich ourselves, in order to strive for new 
China.50 
 
Indeed, Dr. T’ien made a bold political statement on 1 October 1949 when he 
held a tea party at the Lilian Theatre for sixty-five guests, consisting of ‘Chinese 
school teachers, members of local youth associations and representatives of Chinese 
Press’, to celebrate the Communist victory in China. At this gathering, Dr. T’ien and 
other speakers welcomed the new Government of China. The Chairman of the 
Kuching OCYA, Lim Kong Gan, urged his audience to ‘widely propagate the 
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meaning of the birth of new China to various settlements, in order that more Chinese 
would come around to support its cause’. Twice the crowd sang the new Chinese 
national anthem, ‘March of the Volunteers’, and a telegram was drafted to 
congratulate Chairman Mao. 51  According to the colonial Chief Secretary, C.W. 
Dawson, Dr. Tien’s actions ‘caused a furore of excitement in Kuching’.52  
 
Dawson was concerned that this semi-official researcher’s open endorsement 
of the new Chinese Communist regime would be interpreted by the local Chinese 
community as an indication of Britain’s and the West’s weakness vis-à-vis the 
Communist bloc. Consequently, he responded by expelling Dr. T’ien from Sarawak 
on 23 October 1949. In a telegram to the Secretary of State for Colonies, Arthur 
Creech Jones, Dawson urged London to ‘make it clear…that recognition of the new 
Communist Government in China does not imply approval of Russia and that we shall 
continue to combat communist anarchy wherever it is found’. Wary of ‘losing the 
respect of overseas Chinese’, he counselled London to delay recognition of 
Communist China.53 
 
Barely three months later, on 6 January 1950, London established diplomatic 
ties with Communist China. This about-turn in London’s China policy, coupled with 
the perceived rise of China as a major power, achieved the effect on the Overseas 
Chinese Dawson had warned against. A day later, on 7 January, forty-one associations 
and their sixty-eight representatives met at the Kuching Wharf Labourer’s Union 
office and set up the ‘Kuching Overseas Chinese Preparatory Committee’ to celebrate 
the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the establishment of Sino-British 
diplomatic ties. 54  Local left-wing leaders staffed the sixteen-men Preparatory 
Committee: Lim Kong Gan, Chairman of the OCYA, was elected to head the 
Committee and Yang Zhanmou (杨展谋), a progressive teacher, the Secretary. Others 
on the committee included trade guild and youth association leaders, Chinese school 
teachers and principals.55 On 28 January, a full-day carnival took place in Kuching, 
                                                 
51 NCJP, 5.10.1949, p.7 and TNA: PRO CO 927/173/5: Dawson to Jones, 8.10.1949. 
52 NCJP, 5.10.1949, p.7 and TNA: PRO CO 927/173/5: Dawson to Jones, 8.10.1949. 
53 TNA: PRO CO 927/173/5: Dawson to Jones, 8.10.1949. 
54 NCJP, 14.1.1950 and Lau Tzy Cheng, A Study of Historical Events in Sarawak during the 1950s 
(Sibu: Sarawak Chinese Cultural Association, 1992), pp. 35-6. 
55 Lau, Historical Events, pp. 35-6. 
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starting with a mass rally in the morning, followed by a basketball tournament in the 
afternoon and rounding up in the evening with a fire-torch and yangko dance 56 
procession. According to Nan Chiau Jit Poh, four to five thousand participants 
processed through the streets of Kuching, surrounded by a crowd of thirty thousand.57 
Subsequently, similar festive carnivals took place throughout all Chinese major 
settlements in Sarawak.58 The mass rally in Kuching resolved to send Mao Tse-tung 
the following telegram: 
 
The Overseas Chinese in Kuching pledge to uphold the Central 
People’s Government with utmost sincerity and welcome the 
establishment of Sino-British diplomatic relations.59 
 
 It was on the young Chinese in Sarawak that the rise of Communist China 
would have the greatest impact. At the 28 January mass rally, young students Huang 
Jin Mao (黄锦茂) and Tay Chok Chong (郑祝聪) among others called on fellow 
youths to: 
 
…[S]tep up the work of unifying (other youths) instead of shouting 
empty slogans, show our strength, raise both our hands, and hand in 
hand, march forward in big strides. Step up the work of ‘learning and 
practice’ (学习), to start from scratch, ‘learn and practise’ what we 
don’t know and can’t do, and to avoid dogmatism and subjectivism.60 
 
Between February and June 1950, the colonial local intelligence committee 
noticed with alarm the public display of euphoria and increasing rate of ‘Communist’ 
activities among the youth in OCYAs and Chinese schools across the First Division. 
In February, the committee noticed an ‘increase in interest in padi dance (the yangko) 
in schools and Youth Associations around Kuching’. Then on 4 March, ‘speeches 
were made in support of Sino-Soviet friendship and mutual aid and good deal of new 
China jingoism were expressed’ at the Kuching OCYA. By April, it was noted that 
four members of the Kuching OCYA had gone to Miri and Seria and that it had been 
‘carrying on extensive propaganda by means of lectures in outlying parts of 1st 
Division’. In May, school children started making new Chinese flags in art lessons 
                                                 
56 Yangko was a form of peasant’s folk dance popular in Communist-liberated areas in China.  
57 NCJP, 1.2.1950. 
58 Lau, Historical Events, pp. 43-52: the next biggest festival took place at Sibu on 17 February 1950. 
59 ibid. 
60 NCJP, 1.2.1950. 
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and the Students’ Self-Government Society at the Kuching CHMS held a concert in 
which ‘communist songs’ were sung.61 
 
There were two dimensions to the young Chinese’s leaning towards China. 
Under the influence of progressive teachers and print media described in the previous 
section, a unified China under the Communists appealed to the youth’s nationalist 
sentiments. The second was purely practical. Compared to China, Sarawak offered 
few educational and career prospects. The case of this Sarawak youth illustrates a 
longing for China motivated by the two aforementioned motivations: 
 
I am a peasant-gardener, living in a place close to Kuching. By the 
time of the Japanese Occupation I had received Higher Primary 
education. On the Allies’ liberation (of Sarawak), I even entered the 
Chung Hwa Middle School in Kuching to study for several months, but 
due to shortage of funds, I dropped out half-way, and returned to farm 
in the countryside. 
 
Three years passed in a glimpse, there is a primary school in the 
countryside where I live, and I am frequently in touch with the 
schoolteacher. We studied together, and acquired much knowledge. As 
I became imbued with ‘New Democracy’, my mind sobered day by 
day, so that I came to understand what new China meant. Recently, the 
schoolteacher and I decided to return to our country for further studies. 
Having obtained our parents’ permission and our relatives’ help, we 
would perhaps be back for studies by May this year.62 
 
1949 proved to the Overseas Chinese youth that the ‘end goal’ of Communism 
was an attainable one, in which China’s historical evolution provided them with a 
ready template.  Communism’s claim to be universal persuaded those who could not 
‘return’ to China that it could also be applied in Sarawak. Fong Moi Kee was one of 
those who badly wanted to leave for China but had to stay behind for the lack of 
travelling expenses:  
 
One particularly unforgettable event occurred after the founding of 
New China in 1949, when Britain officially recognised Communist 
China. In Sarawak, the left-wing figures eagerly organised a 
celebration. On the streets of Kuching there were processions and 
dancing of the yangko and so on. At that time, I happened to be in 
                                                 
61 TNA: PRO CO 537/6085: SBPIR for February, March, April and May 1950.  
62 NCJP, 30.1.1950. 
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Kuching, and together with my friends and relatives, we went onto the 
streets to watch the crowd. I was so excited that I couldn’t prevent 
myself from joining the procession, tailgating the yangko dancers and 
then starting to dance myself, it was exhilarating to the extremes. From 
that moment onwards, I yearned for new China and the new way of 
living, I hoped that all the peoples of Sarawak would stand up, and 
together we could build a new Sarawak.63 
 
Indeed the success of the CCP in China increased the appeal of communism to 
young Chinese overseas. Fu Yukang (傅玉康), for example, had believed that China 
had ‘created heaven on earth’. This in turn translated into a broader sense of a global 
struggle for justice against the unequal system of old imperialism, which immediately 
became relevant in the local context of colonial Sarawak. Fu was born in 1935 to a 
family of Hakka rubber gardeners in the outskirts of Kuching, where he was a 
member of the Chung Hwa Middle School’s yangko dance delegation in the full-day 
carnival described above. He explains, in hindsight, the appeal of China in the days of 
1949-1950: 
 
At that time, the Chinese newspapers in Kuching gave wide coverage 
to events happening in China, events which were extolled and praised 
with the most enchanting words…giving the impression that the 
leaders of the new Communist-led government were creating heaven 
on earth. To naïve and simple-minded youth, that was very attractive. 
Some progressive teachers exploited the classroom, boldly propagating 
new culture and new thoughts, indoctrinating students with Democracy 
and Communism. Complementing the new developments, the 
Students’ Self-Government Society cyclostyled much information 
from China, featuring the ongoing educational reforms, episodes of 
students’ lives, the campaign for simplification of Han language, etc. 
At the same time, some students purchased from the Commercial Press 
and Joint Publishing Company in Hong Kong many new books, which 
were circulated among schoolmates. As a result, the sparks of anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism began to rekindle and spread among 
the students.64  
 
In this chapter, I showed how Wu Chan and his left-wing intelligentsia circle 
had attempted but failed to capture the leadership of the Chinese community from the 
merchant class. Yet the intelligentsia would leave behind a bigger legacy in their roles 
as transmitters of ideas and promoters of education. Higher rates of literacy and the 
                                                 
63 Interview with Fong Moi Kee, 16.1.2007, p.1. 
64 Ke Feng (a.k.a. Fu Yu Kang), Eaglet Learns to Fly, A Legendary Story of a Sarawak Youth (Hong 
Kong: Inspire Publishing Company, 2005), p. 16.  
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increasing circulation of left-wing newspapers and novels facilitated the transmission 
of Communist ideas to the minds of the ever enlarging group of young Chinese in 
Sarawak. Yet no other factor was more critical than the Communist victory in China 
in 1949 in pushing the wavering and uncertain onto the path of ‘revolution’, a subject 
they had up to this point read about only in fiction and in theory. Now, China offered 
a ready template for action. The next chapter explores how these Chinese youth 




Negotiating the Masses’ Line – A Comparison of Two Students’ Strikes, 1949-
1955 
 
 The previous chapter demonstrated how the political and social forces of the 
post-war world shaped the ideals and aspirations of young Chinese in Sarawak. Over 
the next six years, the radical students struggled to make sense of their revolutionary 
ideals against the reality of a relatively peaceful and contented Sarawak. This chapter 
explores how the youths recovered from a misadventure in 1951 but emerged stronger 
and more organised to succeed in their second attempt. The lessons they learnt in this 
period set the course of their anti-colonial ‘open front’ struggle in the late 1950s.  
 
3.1 The Sarawak New Democratic Youth League and the 29 October 1951 Strike 
 
The first clandestine Communist youth organisation in Sarawak was a 
manifest product of the Chinese Communist revolution. It had been imported into 
Sarawak by students who had furthered their studies in Chinese middle schools in 
Singapore. While studying in the Chinese High School and the Nanyang Girls’ High, 
Yun Dafeng (云大风), Ye Qiuxia (叶秋霞) and Huang Huibai (黄辉白) amongst 
others became members of the Overseas Chinese Progressive Youth Association (进
步华侨青年会, OCPYA).1 The origins of the OCPYA is unclear but according to 
historian C.C. Chin, OCPYA in Singapore and Malaya functioned as a clandestine 
youth wing of the openly registered China Democratic League (中国民主同盟 , 
CDL).2  CDL was in turn founded as a middle way (between the KMT and CCP) 
political party in 1941, though its policies soon leaned towards the CCP and it began 
to operate as a CCP satellite in KMT-controlled ‘white areas’. CDL in Malaya was 
openly registered in 1947 to counter the KMT influence among the Chinese in Malaya. 
Hu Yu-chih, a covert CCP member, headed CDL’s Malaya branch in Singapore until 
                                                 
1 Interviews with Mr. Khoo, 12.5.2006, and Mr. Lin, 1.2.2007. 
2 Interview with C.C. Chin, 30.4.2007. According to Chin, a historian of the MCP, the link between 
OCPYA and CDL has never been recorded in open and published sources. This is based on his 
interview with Yap Hong Hong, a prominent Chinese school principal and leader of the Singapore 
CDL. 
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1948.3 During the time when Yun and Huang were in the Chinese High School, their 
principal Xue Yongshu (薛永黍) had taken over the directorship (1948-1951) of CDL. 
CDL’s stated youth policy was to ‘unite and educate the elite…among the young, to 
become the future cadres of New China and leaders of Overseas Chinese society’.4 It 
was most probably with this agenda in mind that Yun, Ye and Huang set up a branch 
of the OCPYA in Kuching in 1950. 
 
Yet not all young revolutionary-minded Chinese in Kuching agreed with their 
proposition. OCPYA had its bases in the Kuching OCYA and the CHMS Students’ 
Self-Governing Society (学生自理会, SSGS). After the colonial government began to 
clamp down on open propagation of Communism in 1950, more young students 
joined the underground OCPYA (codenamed Y), which concentrated on the spread of 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideas and the training of cadres among students. The leaders 
of OCPYA believed that ethnic Chinese were not ‘integral members’ of local society. 
They proposed instead that the Chinese ‘assist in the local revolution’, as ‘Overseas 
Chinese sojourners’ and in the ‘spirit of internationalism’. The ultimate aims of this 
group were to ‘Go Back North’ and partake in China’s socialist revolution. Yet 
another group of radical students argued that the Chinese had become an integral part 
of the local population. Hence, they should not see themselves as sojourners, but 
needed to shoulder the responsibility of leading revolutionary activities. According to 
Wen Ming Chyuan, who belonged to the latter group, there ensued a ‘fierce struggle’ 
between the two groups, and some time in 1951, the latter prevailed.5  
 
On 21 October 1951, the splinter group within OCPYA, which had advocated 
localising the revolution won the struggle and in OCPYA’s place, set up the Sarawak 
                                                 
3 China Democratic League Central Literary and History Committee (ed.), Historical Sources on the 
China Democratic League (Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 1991), p. 99. It was only in June 
1953 that CDL, ‘in consideration of internal and external developments’, closed all its overseas 
branches. See China Democratic League Central Literary and History Committee (ed.), A Collection of 
Commemorative Essays on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Founding of the China Democratic League 
(Beijing: Qun Yan Publishing House, 2001), p. 94. 
4 Yap Hong Hong, The Trial of Fifteen Years of Wandering (Singapore: Seng Yew Book Store, 1996), 
p.178.  
5 Wen Ming Chyuan, ‘A Historical Outline of the Struggles of the Sarawak Liberation SLL’ (1965?); 
‘The Historical Strengths and Weaknesses of the Organisation’ (September 1963).  
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New Democratic Youth League (砂拉越新民主主义青年团，SNDYL).6 Three of its 
most prominent leaders were Huang Jinmao (黄锦茂), Qiu Liben (丘立本) and Tay 
Chok Chong (郑祝聪). All were students of the Kuching CHMS.7 Among the three, 
Huang Jinmao was the central figure. It has been surmised that he might have got in 
touch with the MCP while he was in transit in Singapore on his way to China in 1950. 
Huang then returned to further his studies in the newly appended Senior Middle 
Section in the Kuching CHMS.8 By October 1951, Tay Chok Chong had graduated 
from the CHMS. He was noted by the local intelligence committee to be ‘a former 
office-bearer of the SSGS, and a great supporter of New China among the students’.9 
Qiu Liben was a classmate of Huang’s in the pioneer batch of the Senior Middle One 
level in 1951. According to Wen’s report, SNDYL ‘opposed the “Go Back North” 
line’ and ‘set their hands free’ to mobilise the masses, starting from the Kuching 
CHMS and OCYA’. To differentiate itself from OCPYA, it was codenamed ‘X’.10  
 
The need to go underground had, as mentioned earlier, been intensified by the 
Sarawak colonial government’s determination to outlaw ‘communism’ ever since the 
outbreak of the communist insurrection in Malaya in June 1948. These efforts were 
strengthened after 1949. In 1950 alone, laws were passed in the colonial-dominated 
Council Negri (Sarawak’s legislative body) to restrict the freedom of movement of 
‘undesirable’ persons in March, display of foreign emblems in June, and freedom of 
assembly in July. By far the most significant piece of legislation passed in that year 
was the Undesirable Persons (Amendment) Act on 21 November 1950. It gave the 
Governor-in-Council the power to deport any Sarawak-born, non-indigenous person 
who was deemed to have ‘obstructed public welfare’.11  
 
                                                 
6 Ibid. Wen avers to October 1951 as the founding date of SNDYL, the exact date is given in Hardy, 
Danger Within, p.2. Porritt’s assertion that Wen Ming Chyuan was one of the students leaders at the 
Kuching Chung Hwa Middle School in October 1951 is inaccurate. Wen had joined Chung Hwa Public 
School in Miri as a teacher in ‘autumn 1951’. See Miri Chong Hwa Public School New School Block 
Commemorative Volume (Miri: Miri Chung Hwa Public School New School Block Committee, 1951), 
p. 75. 
7 Interview with Lin Guixing, 1.2.2007.  
8 The character ‘Huang Kun’ refers, most probably to Huang Jinmao. For Huang’s reversal from 
Singapore back to Sarawak see Ke, Eaglet, pp. 22-3. 
9 TNA: PRO CO 1022/201, SBPIR, November 1951. 
10 Wen, ‘Historical Outline’. 
11 Lau, Sarawak during the 1950s, pp. 96-117. For an English-language, though less complete 
compilation of anti-communist legislation, see Porritt, Communism in Sarawak, Appendix 1, pp. 255-6. 
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These recently acquired powers were quickly exercised to check the growth of 
Communism among the Chinese. In May 1950, the first notification list of ten 
prohibited Communist books was published.12 The following month saw the first 
CHMS teacher, Chen Chao Fah, dismissed for being ‘too political’ in his history 
lessons. 13  Then in September, immigration regulations were tightened to prevent 
young Chinese who went to China for education from returning.14 The leftist Chung 
Hwa Journal was forced to close on 1 May 1951. Its sister paper, Chiau Sheng Pau, 
suffered a similar fate three months later. The most direct blow to the radical students 
would come on 30 June 1951, when a police raid on the premises of the CHMS SSGS 
uncovered ‘prohibited books’, causing the Secretary of Chinese Affairs to declare it 
an unlawful society. Two leaders of the SSGS were expelled. Following the incident, 
the headmaster, Wu Chan and the principal, Lim Chong Chew, resigned.15 Then from 
1951, the Board of Management began to recruit ex-KMT government officials from 
Hong Kong as teachers for the Middle School. No less than 53 would be recruited 
between 1951 and 1957.16 
 
The draconian laws and repressive measures in turn created the favourable 
conditions for SNDYL to launch a strike and ‘mobilise the masses’ in October 1951. 
From October 1951 to February 1952, the strike would be directed against the 
‘reactionary’ principal and the colonial government’s attempt to replace left-wing 
teachers in the Kuching CHMS with new anti-Communist recruits.17 Among those 
targeted were Tu Naiping (涂耐冰), history teacher and KMT member, Ralph Yang 
Yuhua (杨毓华), English teacher and a suspected informer of Special Branch, Lin 
Bomei (林伯美), the new Discipline Master, recruited from Hong Kong to replace 
Wu Chan and Zhang Jun (张俊), an American-graduate who replaced Lim Chong 
Chew as principal from July 1951.18 These new staff members had begun to restrict 
the students’ left-wing activities after the June 1951 incident.  
 
                                                 
12 Lau, ibid, p. 76 and NCJP, 1.7.1950. One book which might already have slipped through was ‘How 
to build a New Democratic Youth SLL’, published by China Youth Press. 
13 TNA: PRO CO 537/6085, SBPIR, June 1950 and NJCP, 19.6.1950. 
14 TNA: PRO CO 537/6085, SBPIR, September 1950. 
15 TNA: PRO CO 537/7340, SBPIR, June 1951 and Ke, Eaglet, p. 17. 
16 Liu, Twenty Years, pp. 98-9. 
17 Wen, ‘Historical Outline’. 
18 Liu, Twenty Years, pp. 98-99; Ke, Eaglet, p. 18, and TNA: PRO CO 1022/201: SBPIR, January 1952.  
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 Daily confrontation between students and school authorities had started on 14 
October over the ostensible reason of unfair grading in an examination and the alleged 
ineptitude of the teacher involved. These stand-offs turned violent on 25 October, 
when the students wrecked the intransigent principal’s living quarters. At this point, 
the principal approached the Secretary of Chinese Affairs, Tom Cromwell, for help. 
Consequently, the police intervened and detained the student leaders on 29 October.19 
These detentions set off a siege of the principal by a crowd of more than a hundred 
students, which the police had eventually to disperse with one tear-gas shell. It was at 
this point when, under the direction of SNDYL, a 19-member ‘Strike Directing 
Group’ (罢课领导小组), consisting of representatives from each class in school and 
headed by Huang Jinmao, Tay Chok Chong and Qiu Liben was set up and the 103-
day school-wide strike officially began.20 This first students’ strike in Sarawak history 
would be remembered by the Chinese as the October Twenty-ninth Strike. 
 
 Over the next three months, three factors determined in whose favour the 
confrontation would work out. First, the court would determine in December whether 
the radical students responsible for the two acts of violence (25 and 29 October) were 
guilty, and if so mete out the appropriate penalty. Second, the Kuching Chung Hwa 
Schools Board of Management, caught in the midst of their social responsibility to the 
parents and political pressure from the opposing ‘Strike Directing Group’ and 
Cromwell, would decide in January 1952 on the number of radical students to expel 
from the school and the fate of principal Zhang Jun. Third and the most important of 
all, public opinion would eventually determine, some time in April, which side had 
won. Cromwell’s letter to his parents in November 1951 indicated his appreciation of 
the situation: 
 
The Chinese are furious with me for interfering in an unprecedented 
manner with the way they run their schools, because of course they all 
realize that it is me prodding the education department, and the 
Chinese who are race-proud and nationalistic (i.e. whether pro-
communist or pro-KMT) all realize that the CHMS is deliberately 
being used as a test piece, as to whether the staff of these schools shall 
be pro or anti Britain and America, Christianity, communism, Chinese 
                                                 
19 SOAS: GB 102 PP MS 33, Box 7 File 29: Cromwell to parents, 1.11.1950.  
20 Li, ‘Stormy Times (37): 29 October Strike (2)’ in, SIT, 25.8.2006; Interview with Teo Yong Kiaw, 
6.3.2007; Interview with Bong Kee Chok and Kee Siaw, 5-6.1.2007. 
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race-pride and so on… everybody thinks that the strikers are going to 
win, including the students still at school and the majority of the 
teachers!21  
  
So while Cromwell fixed his goals on steeling the education department and 
the management of the school for action, the students lost sight of theirs when they 
abandoned their initial demand for staff changes to embrace an all-out call for the 
defeat of ‘colonialism’. 22  The court’s decision in December 1950 to let off the 
students with a $100 fine, with no apology required, had initially worked in the 
students’ favour.23 Then came, on 17 January 1952, the newly re-elected Board of 
Management’s compromise decision to dismiss both the 18 student leaders and 
principal Zhang Jun.24 But the students continued with their lofty sloganeering in the 
premises of the Kuching OCYA, hitherto the meeting place of the student leaders. On 
28 January 1952, the tide turned in the colonial government’s favour. Cromwell led 
the police to raid an ‘Oppose U.S.A., Assist Korea’ performance staged by the strikers 
at OCYA and personally tore down a Chinese Communist flag in the process.25 The 
Kuching OCYA, whose Chairman (Yang You) the British wrongly perceived as the 
head of the Communist movement, was de-registered on 13 February. 26  The 
masterstroke was however the appointment of an ‘iron-fist’ education department 
inspector, a local Chinese, Hsu Yaw Tong, to head the Middle School in April 1952. 
Hsu enforced a compulsory re-registration of all students, abolished the entire senior 
middle section responsible for the strike and expelled a further 15 students.27 The acts 
of wrecking a Communist show, proscribing the stronghold of ‘Communism’ and 
making all parents pledge for their children’s good behaviour drove the message 
home to the Chinese public. In the meantime, the expelled student leaders, fearful of 
further arrests, fled to West Kalimantan in February 1952.28  
 
                                                 
21 SOAS: GB 102 PP MS 33, Box 7 File 29: Cromwell to parents, 26.11.1951. 
22 According to SIT feature writer Li Zhenyuan, it was at the 1 December 1951 memorial service held 
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25 The whole incident is recorded in graphical detail in Ke, Eaglet, p. 32-35. A toned down account of 
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26 Sarawak Government Gazette, 13.2.1952. 
27 Liu, ibid., pp. 104-9. 
28 Ke, Eaglet, p. 57 and TNA: PRO CO 1022/201, SBPIR, March 1952. 
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3.2 Defeat and Dissolution 
 
 Yet colonial victory was complete only in August 1952 with the declaration of 
an Emergency in the First Division of Sarawak. The colonial government had seized 
the opportunity to enact the martial laws, which restricted the people’s freedom of 
movement, between 8 August 1952 and 16 January 1953 when an armed gang of four 
from West Kalimantan, purporting to act in the name of the ‘Sarawak People’s 
Liberation Army’, extorted the village of Batu Kitang and shot dead a policeman on 
its flight back across the border.29  Declassified minutes of the Supreme Council 
(highest executive body in the colony) meetings during the period reveal that despite 
the lack of evidence of political ramifications wider than the isolated criminal incident, 
the government chose to ‘make the most serious assessment of the present situation’, 
in order to prevent the recurrence of the communist insurrection as in Malaya.30 None 
of the armed perpetrators were ever found. In fact as early as 18 August, Cromwell 
had formed the opinion that they were a ‘purely criminal gang, using Communism as 
a cover to bolster up [their] morale and to intimidate the Chinese’. 31  Why then 
prolong the Emergency for another four months? 
 
 The official justification – the need to demonstrate the government’s will to 
prevent the recurrence of the Malayan Emergency32 – was only a minor part of the 
reason. The imposition of the Emergency regulations achieved three underlying 
policy goals. First, the ‘Communist’ scare associated with an ‘Emergency’ moved 
imperial resources to beef up Sarawak’s anti-insurrection capability at a rate the local 
colonial government would otherwise not have enjoyed under peaceful conditions. 
Cromwell himself exposed the media over-hype to his parents, who were back in 
England: 
 
Do not be too disturbed at the way journalists have blown up the 
Sarawak emergency to a tremendous size…I think everybody is 
deciding to try out in Sarawak all the schemes they would have been 
                                                 
29 For a narrative account of the events, see Porritt, Communism in Sarawak, pp. 12-17.  
30 TNA: PRO CO 1022/80: Minutes of Supreme Council, 7.8.1952, 14.8.1952, 8.1.1953. 
31 SOAS: GB 102 PP MS 33, Box 8 File 30, Cromwell to parents, 18.8.1952. 
32 The ‘Malayan Emergency’ was declared by the British colonial government in the Federation of 
Malaya in June 1948 to forestall the armed insurrection planned by the Malayan Communist Party. 
Emergency laws suspended the civil liberties of the people to move, assemble, speak and form 
organizations freely.  
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able to carry out in Malaya if they hadn’t been caught 
napping…Nearly everybody is enjoying themselves immensely: we all 
feel that we are several jumps ahead and we intend to keep it that 
way.33 
 
As a result of the ‘Emergency’, Sarawak received two platoons of police help from 
the colony of North Borneo for the duration of five weeks. The Deputy Director of 
Operations in Malaya, General Sir Rob Lockhart carried out a general review of 
Sarawak’s security problems and capabilities. The review, over the course of 1953-54, 
resulted in an addition of three hundred and eighty personnel (or one-third of existing 
forces) to the Sarawak constabulary, the consolidation of the Special Branch under an 
Assistant Commissioner, and the extension of the intelligence activities beyond 
Kuching to Simanggang, Sibu, Miri and Kuala Belait.34 
 
Secondly, the Emergency gave the government powers to detain and deport 
‘Communist’ suspects, without granting them a trial in a court of law as they would 
have been entitled to in peacetime. On the day the Emergency was declared, twenty-
six blacklisted people were detained, the five most notorious of whom were deported 
to China within the space of a week. Among the five, three (Wu Chan, Lee Shu Foon 
and Tan Sze Min) were members of the wartime Anti-Fascist SLL, and one, Chai Sze 
Chung (蔡思忠) had been Chairman of the SSGS in Kuching CHMS. 35 At the end of 
the Emergency, thirty people were detained, of whom sixteen were deported to or had 
left on their own volition for China, seven released on bond, and a further seven still 
being held.36 
 
Finally, the involvement of Indonesian elements in the Batu Kitang incident 
gave the Sarawak government good grounds to initiate joint efforts with the 
Indonesian authorities to crack down on the SNYDL student leaders, who were by 
then living in exile in West Kalimantan. On 18 August, a delegation of three Sarawak 
officials, Tom Cromwell, the Commissioner of Sarawak Constabulary and Haji 
Mustapha Datu Bandar (Adviser on Malay Affairs), together with a representative of 
                                                 
33 ibid. 
34 Porritt, ibid., p. 16. 
35 TNA: PRO CO 1022/201, SBPIR, August and September 1952. 
36 TNA: PRO CO 1022/80, Minutes of the Supreme Council, 8.1.1953. 
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British Security Intelligence (Far East) 37 , held a conference at Pemangkat with 
Indonesia’s Attorney-General, Head of the Intelligence Service, and Pontianak’s 
Chief of Police and Resident. It was reported that ‘hopes of future cooperation against 
Chinese Communists were expressed and information about the Emergency and on 
persons who were suspected of having unlawfully entered Kalimantan Barat from 
Sarawak was given to the Indonesian representatives’.38 Fu Yukang’s memoir shows 
that the group of seven student exiles had settled in Pontianak by June 1952. They had 
been kept informed of events in Kuching and were aware of the Emergency as well as 
Cromwell’s visit to West Kalimantan in August 1952. While they had initially 
planned to infiltrate back into Sarawak, these plans were abandoned under the 
subsequent pursuit by the Indonesian police. In consequence, they left Pontianak for 
Jakarta in April 1953 before setting off for China three months later.39 
 
Hence, by January 1953, the colonial government was indeed ‘several jumps 
ahead’ of left-wing forces in Sarawak. The government’s will to nip ‘Communism’ in 
the bud had been demonstrated during the latter half of the 29 October students’ strike 
and again in the 1952 Emergency. By the end of the Emergency, SNDYL student 
leaders, the war-time Anti-Fascist SLL members and the left-wing Overseas Chinese 
intelligentsia had been forcibly removed from Sarawak.  
 
The failure of the October Twenty-ninth Strike and colonial repression under 
the Emergency regulations triggered a wider social impact than the removal of left-
wing leaders. That a ‘socialist’ society would not be attainable in the near future in 
Sarawak triggered a wave of youth migration ‘back’ to China between 1952 and 1955. 
From mid-1952, the colonial state began to monitor figures of youth migration during 
this period precisely because it became concerned at the unprecedented spike in youth 
migration numbers. Between 1953 and June 1956, the annual numbers of young 
people aged between twelve and twenty-five who migrated to China for good were 
347, 586, 258 and 200 (first ten months of 1956) respectively.40 These were a small 
proportion of Sarawak’s young Chinese, but coming from the educated and informed 
group, they in fact represented a disproportionate fraction of the young educated elites 
                                                 
37 This is a Mr. Oldfield, whose full name and identity is not available. 
38 TNA: PRO CO 1022/201, SBPIR, August and September 1952. 
39 Ke, Eaglet, pp. 318-368. 
40 Compiled from SBPIR, 1952-1956 in TNA: PRO CO/1022/201 and CO/1030/242. 
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of Chinese society. Teo Yong Kiaw, a Junior Middle Two student at CHMS in 1952 
recalls: 
 
…(I)n the later stages of the strike, some people brought up (the 
question of) whether we should return to China or stay behind. At that 
time, the strike had not ended, (but) many had started feeling 
disappointed with the struggle, so many of them started applying to 
return to China. My elder sister was one of them. Among my 
classmates, more than 20 out of 40-over people left. Perhaps they felt 
dejected over the defeat of the strike, but their wish to study in China 
was another reason for their departure.41 
 
Wen Ming Chyuan’s evaluation of the October Twenty-ninth Strike is 
significant for two reasons. First, we know that Wen was a member of SNDYL 
though he was not in Kuching throughout the duration of the strike. His evaluation is 
hence the closest we have to an internal assessment of the short-lived SNDYL. More 
significantly, the lessons Wen claimed to have learnt from the failures of SNDYL 
would be applied to his orchestration of a much more successful clandestine 
organisation and its coming-of-age school strike in March 1955. This assessment is 
hence worth quoting at length: 
 
The major weaknesses of ‘X’ [i.e. SNDYL] were its organisational 
flaws and political naiveté. Its main leaders, under the influence and 
deception of the leftist opportunist Kuching OCYA Chairman Yang 
You, made a leftist opportunist error, in an unduly ‘left’ struggle. 
Especially in the latter stages when work on the ‘united front’ was 
neglected, [the struggle was] removed from the broad masses, even 
removed from students, who participated in early stages of the strike, 
while preparations for the enemy’s retaliation were poorly made. When 
the enemy attacked, the main leading cadres retreated from Sarawak 
hastily…so that the spectacular October Twenty-ninth struggle 
eventually ended in defeat.42 
 
After the departure of the main SNDYL leaders from February 1952 and the 
dissolution of SNDYL during the 1952 Emergency, former members of SNDYL set 
up two clandestine organisations: the ‘Progressive Teachers’ Association’ (进步教师
会 ) and a ‘Students’ Society’ (同学会 ). The Teachers’ Association ‘united and 
organised progressive Chinese school teachers, especially those young teachers who 
                                                 
41 Interview with Teo Yong Kiaw, 6.3.2007. 
42 Wen, ‘Historical Outline’. 
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had been won over by the 29 October students’ strike’. They were ‘sent to rural 
Chinese schools across Sarawak to be teachers, while initiating the peasants’ 
movement’. The Students’ Society ‘took charge of students’ movement in the 
Kuching middle school … [and] started the students’ movement in the Third and 
Fourth Divisions’.43  
 
Wen Ming Chyuan was most probably the head of the Students’ Society in the 
Kuching CHMS.44 Wen was born in 1932 at Kampong Maong, a Hakka-Methodist 
settlement three miles to the west of Kuching along the Sarawak River. His family 
sold vegetables at the Gambir Street market in Kuching. Wen attended the Kuching 
CHMS at the same time as Teo Yong Jim. In the autumn of 1951, before the outbreak 
of the October Twenty-ninth Strike, he left Kuching for a teaching post in a Chinese 
primary school, the Miri Chung Hwa Public School. That Wen was already a member 
of OCPYA/SNDYL by the time he arrived in Miri was indicated by his subsequent 
action during the 1951 strike. According to Lui How Ming, Wen’s local follower, 
Wen taught him to cyclostyle pamphlets, and instructed him to print news of the 
ongoing students’ strike for distribution throughout the shop-houses and market of 
Miri. Lui How Ming was subsequently inducted into SNDYL under Wen in early 
1952.45 Wen’s teaching stint in Miri proved short-lived. In 1953, he returned to attend 
the Kuching CHMS Senior Middle Section.46  
 
Among ex-members of SNDYL, there emerged divergent opinions over 
whether to hang on to the ‘revolution’. The passive group argued that ‘the failure [of 
the 29 October Strike] indicated that objective conditions for a revolutionary struggle 
did not exist in Sarawak ‘hence they proposed abandoning the revolution’. Moreover, 
this group ‘considered the standard of learning in Marxist-Leninist theories to be too 
low’, so that revolutionary work should only be re-initiated when standards were 
raised. However, a more active faction, led most likely by Wen Ming Chyuan, pointed 
                                                 
43 Wen, ibid. 
44 As far as I can ascertain, Wen was the only SNDYL member to have established contacts in the 
Third and Fourth Divisions as Wen did in the early 1950s during his sojourn to Miri. In early 1952, 
Wen had despatched Lui How Ming to Sibu to extend SNDYL network to Chinese school students in 
the Third Division, while he himself stayed on in Miri (Fourth Division) for another year. 
45 Interview with Lui How Ming, 10.1.2007 
46 Teo Yong Kiaw, who was in Junior Middle Three (Upper) in 1953, remembers that Wen was directly 
one year his senior in Senior Middle One when he ‘returned’. Interview with Teo Yong Kiaw, 6.3.2007. 
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out that the masses’ demand for revolution was a given under any colonial situation, 
hence the ‘question hinged on how to lead the masses in a revolutionary uprising’, 
rather than whether or not to start one. Indeed, this group further cited Mao Tse-tung, 
to support the view that ‘Marxist-Leninist theories could only be properly mastered 
through the execution of revolution’.47 
 
The ‘passive group’ referred to in Wen’s document appears to have been the 
Teachers’ Association led by Chin Shaw Tung. Chin had escaped the colonial 
government’s attention during the 1952 Emergency and most probably took over the 
Teachers’ Association from Wu Chan after the latter’s deportation. Chin, co-owner of 
Thai Kong bookstore on India Street in downtown Kuching controlled the lucrative 
textbook trade throughout the First and Second Divisions’ Chinese schools. Through 
his network with Chinese schools, Chin also had nominal control over the movement 
of Chinese teachers in the region.48 At the same time, he provided scholarships and 
free boarding for needy primary school graduates to further their studies at the 
Kuching CHMS. 49  Chin’s mansion in Kuching became a meeting centre for 
progressive teachers and boarding house for students. His nom-de-guerre was ‘the 
underground Director of Education’.50 While disagreeing with Wen, Chin nonetheless 
kept on very good terms with the students.51 Bong Kee Chok, who was a member of 
the underground Students’ Society, recalls the difference in temperament between the 
two allied by separate cliques: 
 
At that time there were two propositions. Chin Shaw Tung’s group, 
they were more senior in age. They were not SLL members [but] could 
be counted as our supporters [and] we in turn respected them. This 
clique organised the teachers. We advocated initiating [the revolution] 
from students. [Both cliques] worked in coordination. Later on, we 
proved that organising students was [the] correct [move], because 
students had the most vigour…Those teachers who were older and had 
more exposure to society were more complicated, so that they often 
had such problems as familial considerations. Those of us who 
emerged from the cultivation of the students’ strikes were full of 
                                                 
47 Wen, ‘Historical Outline’. 
48 Interview with Fong Moi Kee, 16.1.2007. 
49 One such beneficiary was Voon Chang Liew, from the 17th Mile. In return, Voon had to distribute 
the Sin Wen Pau for a couple of months. Interview with Voon Chang Liew, 30.1.2007.  
50 Li, ‘Stormy Times (29): The Cession Crisis (2)’, in SIT, 17.8.2006.   
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passion. We were the ones who truly devoted ourselves to the 
revolutionary calling without any hesitation. We were committed to the 
end. And this was how we gradually built on our strength.52 
 
3.3 The Founding of the Sarawak Liberation League (SLL) 
 
Wen Ming Chyuan’s question of ‘how to lead the masses’ was answered with 
the return of Teo Yong Jim （张荣任） to Sarawak. Teo was born between 1927 and 
1930 in Kuching to a family of Teochew grocers.53 From young, Teo had developed a 
keen interest in politics. He followed the course of the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949) 
battles on radio and reported the events to the family’s grocery store assistants. He 
was also a voracious reader of modern Chinese novels and political treatises. During 
Dr. T’ien J’u-kang’s field trip to Sarawak from September 1948 to October 1949, the 
scholar apparently made daily visits to his Gambir Street shop-house, where they 
probably had discussions about China’s politics. Teo attended the Kuching CHMS 
from 1946 to 1949, when he switched to the English-medium St. Joseph’s School and 
passed his Senior Cambridge examination within a year. Wong Syn Ted, his 
classmate at St. Joseph’s, recognised his ‘exceptional intelligence … and early 
inclinations to socialism’.54 Upon graduation, he taught English in his alma mater, the 
CHMS, until June 1950, when he resigned in protest over the management’s decision 
to dismiss Chen Chao Fah, a history teacher, for introducing politics in his lessons.55 
In late 1950, Teo headed to Singapore, where he contacted the Malayan Communist 
Party (MCP).56 Upon his return to Kuching by July 1953, he and Wen founded the 
Sarawak Liberation League (SLL) modelled on the MCP’s satellite organisation in 
Singapore, the Anti-British League (ABL).57  
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Teo’s return fundamentally altered the course of Sarawak’s socialist 
revolution. First, he instituted the ABL’s secret cell organisation among the 
revolutionaries. Second, it was probably through Teo’s study of the ABL’s strategy in 
Singapore that a similar course for SLL was subsequently set. During his time in 
Kuching, Teo lived in an isolated attap house in Wen Ming Chyuan’s hometown 
Kampong Maong. With SLL in place, Teo and Wen set about recruiting new 
members. One of the first members they recruited was Teo’s younger brother, Yong 
Kiaw, as the latter recalled: 
 
That was when I was in Junior Middle Three [in school], that is 1953. 
 
One day, Wen Ming Chyuan brought me to Kampong Maong, where 
he and my Third Brother (Yong Jim) had built a very small attap house, 
the walls were all made of wooden planks, the roof attap. There, the 
front door was locked, while the back was bolted from the inside. Then, 
Wen Ming Chyuan knocked a few times on the front door to signal the 
secret code, my Third Brother opened the backdoor, we went round the 
back, and from there entered the house. 
 
At that time I was full of surprise to see my Third Brother since we had 
not met for three to four years. Then, Wen Ming Chyuan asked, “Now 
we want you to join the Liberation League. Do you agree?” I said I 
agreed, and then I took the oath. 
 
My brother spoke straight to my face, “We may be brothers, but today 
you are here to join the organisation, ours is a relationship between the 
superior and subordinate, not of brothers, we are talking about 
revolutionary careers. If you want to enter the organisation, you must 
be prepared to sacrifice your life, to follow the discipline, regulations 
and constitution, etc. of the organisation.” Finally I signed my name, 
and in the face of Marx and Lenin portraits I swore an oath. Then, they 
distributed some documents, the ‘Disciplinary Code’ (严密细则) and 
‘Constitution’ for my reading.58  
 
                                                                                                                                            
list of ‘founder members… Wen Ming Chyuan, Wong Fuk Ing, Lam Wah Kwai, Bong Kee Chok, Qiu 
Li Ben and Teo Yong Jim’ is inaccurate: Qiu had left Sarawak for China through West Kalimantan by 
1952, Bong would join SLL as Wen’s subordinate only in late 1953, while Lam would not enter the 
‘organsisation’ until after March 1955. See Hyde, Guerrilla War, pp. 64-67.  Hardy, Danger Within¸ p. 
3; Porritt, Communism in Sarawak, p. 17 and interviews with Bong Kee Chok and Bong Kee Siaw, 4-
5.1.2007; Lim Ho Kui, 7.3.2007. 
58 Interview with Teo Yong Kiaw, 6.3.2007. That would be the last time the brothers met until 1986 
when Yong Jim suddenly appeared in Kuching, a successful businessman under the guise of a new 
Indonesian identity.  
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One other task Yong Jim undertook was the training of SLL’s Sibu cell, headed by 
Lui How Ming. Lui had gone to Sibu, Sarawak’s next largest town, under the orders 
of Wen to extend SNDYL’s network. Some time in 1954, Lui received orders to take 
his entire leadership cell to Kuching for a ‘conversion course’. In the Kampong 
Maong hut, Teo gave lectures, presumably about the new form and political line of 
SLL, to Lui and two of his subordinates. Interestingly, Lui remembers Teo 
assiduously studying the colonial civics textbook Sarawak and its Government.59 The 
textbook meant for educating the colonised peoples about the merits of British 
governance was being studied for its subversion.  
 
Some time in 1954, Teo Yong Jim left Sarawak, SLL and the revolution to the 
sole charge of Wen Ming Chyuan. The most plausible explanation for his departure is 
that they had differed over SLL’s policy. Local writer Li Zhenyuan argues that Yong 
Jim had wanted to subsume SLL under MCP guidance, whereas Wen Ming Chyuan 
wished SLL to remain a purely local affair.60 Yet Bong Kee Chok refutes this theory. 
According to Bong, neither the CCP nor the MCP would have agreed, from the very 
start, to lead Sarawak’s revolution from a distance. Both parties had suffered losses 
under policies dictated either by the Comintern or Comintern representatives. They 
would have insisted that Sarawak led its own indigenous revolution.61 In retrospect, 
whatever the merits of the debate that went on between the two, Wen would most 
probably have prevailed, given his control of the former SNDYL contacts. It is 
perhaps safe to assume that the line of debate that won was the revolutionary course 
Wen took thereon.  
 
3.4 The Masses’ Line in the 30 March 1955 Strike 
 
Under the direct aid and guidance of the Malayan Communist Party-
led Anti-British League, SLL was founded in July 1953. The founding 
of the League symbolised the entry of the Sarawak revolution into a 
new phase. The League unequivocally recognised Marxism-Leninism 
and Mao Tse-tung Thought as its guiding philosophy, accepted the 
organisational experience of the MCP, and absorbed both positive and 
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negative lessons of Y and X [the Overseas Chinese Progressive Youth 
League and Sarawak New Democratic Youth League]. In the early 
stages of development, [the League] placed special emphasis on 
building up the organisation … on organisational discipline and strict 
procedures in underground conditions. At the same time, [the League] 
enhanced the education of members’ thoughts and stipulated a reading 
list of compulsory documents and Marx, Lenin and Mao works. This 
ensured the League’s steady growth. The League devised the political 
direction, ‘Set our hands free to mobilise the masses. Actively launch 
revolution’, and opposed the ‘Be wary of Struggle, Passive 
Revolution’ line of thought. (This line of thought was prevalent during 
the early stages of the League’s establishment.) With the aim of 
nurturing cadres for the revolution, the League placed emphasis on the 
students’ movement during the early stages, hence the establishment of 
the satellite organisation ‘Sarawak Advanced Youth Association’.62 
 
The early years (1953-5) were a time of consolidation. The most significant 
change to the organisation was its implementation of the ABL template of the 
triangular cell system. Previously, SNDYL had managed its cadres more loosely with 
no strictly enforced ‘Disciplinary Code’ and on the basis of one-to-one contacts. Now, 
great emphasis was placed on secrecy. Members were strictly forbidden from 
contacting other comrades than their directly subordinate cells, their cell mates, and 
their immediate superior. Within the organisation, members used only their nom-de-
guerre. As stated above, more emphasis was placed on indoctrination.  
 
Wen Ming Chyuan maintained a highly rigorous policy of recruitment from 
the start. According to Bong Kee Chok, Wen set strict rules restricting membership to 
people with ‘clean’ backgrounds. Those with complex social relations, such as 
previous SNDYL members who had been ‘exposed’ during the October Twenty-ninth 
Strike in 1951, were excluded. The early SLL consisted of a small circle of Kuching 
CHMS students, highly trained in Marxist-Leninist theories. Other than Lin Yonglun 
(林永伦), a discipline master of the 17th Mile (Simmangang Road) Chung Hwa Public 
School, most early members were Kuching CHMS students. According to Douglas 
Hyde, there were nineteen Communist cells in Sarawak, the majority in the Kuching 
Chung Hwa Middle School and a few in Sibu, with a total of about one hundred 
members by the end of 1954.63 This figure appears to have been an overestimate, 
probably by including the members of the Teachers’ Association. Until 1955, SLL 
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members included Wang Fuk Ing (王馥英)，who married Wen in 1960, Bong Kee 
Chok (黄纪作), Bong Kee Siaw (黄纪晓), Fong Moi Kee (洪梅枝), Tan Lee Seng 
(陈礼森), Ang Cho Teng (洪楚庭), Lai Jieyuan (赖介元) and Chen Jinmei (陈金美). 
In Sibu, Lui How Ming led a small budding group. They would form the core 
leadership of the League under the undisputed control of Wen Ming Chyuan. 
 
 Wen Ming Chyuan reported, in 1965, that the lessons learnt from the failure of 
the October Twenty-ninth Strike were the ‘organisational flaws and political naiveté’ 
of SNDYL and its ‘unduly left’ struggle.64 After some two and a half years of reform 
and consolidation, how would Wen carry the revolution forward from 1955? ‘Set our 
hands free to mobilise the masses. Actively launch revolution.’ In short, they would 
follow the ‘masses’ line’. This line of action would be tested in an SLL-led students 
strike, which lasted for forty-seven days from 30 March to 16 May.  
 
 To analyse the role SLL played in the strike, it will be necessary to first give a 
brief account of the sequence of events that took place in the public domain. On 26 
February 1955, at the weekly school assembly, the monitors of Class B, Junior Middle 
Two (Lower Standard), Wong Chock Yin (王祚英) and Zhuang Jin Ming (庄金明) 
called for their math teacher, Chai Yun Chee (蔡永祺) to improve his teaching 
methods, which they criticised as ‘too slow, incomprehensible, [and] negligent of 
students’ homework’.65 The monitors entered negotiations with the school, but Chai 
prevented them from giving the school assembly an update the following week, 
accusing the monitors of being ‘impostor leaders’, who were ‘finding an excuse to 
create unrest’. Incensed, the students demanded an explanation from the principal, 
Huang Zhong Jin (黄中廑), who deferred until the third day (10 March), when the 
students declared the same afternoon as the final deadline. From the students’ 
perspective, the principal gave an ‘incomplete and ambiguous’ answer. Huang 
retaliated the next afternoon with a notice declaring that the monitors and Zhang 
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Benren (张本仁), another classmate who had ‘expressed opinions and doubts’ at the 
meeting, had been given ‘black marks’ for ‘creating trouble on the pretext of 
improving pedagogy’, ‘bullying the class into the blackmail action’ and ‘setting the 
principal a deadline’. After repeated appeals were turned down, the class petitioned 
the principal and the Board of Management on 14 March for the retraction of 
penalties and for the latter to ‘uphold justice’. This triggered Huang to summon the 
entire class individually for interrogation to identify the ‘culprits’.  
 
On 16 March, the students made further appeals on behalf of their leaders and 
when ignored, Class B, Junior Middle Two (Lower) went on strike. On the same day, 
they convened the monitors and chairmen of all classes in school. The meeting elected 
an eight-man ‘All Students’ Representative Delegation’, headed by Bong Kee Chok, 
Yap Choon Ho (叶存厚) and Chen Sheng Xin (陈胜新). The delegation immediately 
pressed the management for ‘justice’. The management’s guarantee against any 
further punishment for the student leaders appeared to have appeased them until the 
principal objected. Huang ignored the management’s summon to hearings. Instead, he 
issued a public statement and led his entire staff to go on a three-day strike from 21-
23 March. On 26 March, the students’ delegation rebutted the principal and for the 
first time called for his resignation. The next day, Huang in turn demanded that ‘2 
students be expelled, 13 temporarily suspended and 16 to write letters of apology’. 
The management agreed and it was announced that school would resume on 30 March. 
At this point the delegation sent a boycott warning to the thirteen Chinese associations 
that formed the Board of Management. This went unheeded. Hence, on 30 March, the 
forty-seven day boycott started, with a consistent 157 out of 1300 students attending 
school. During the forty-seven days, student leaders organised tuition classes, picnics, 
excursions and regular meetings to keep the striking students updated on events.  The 
conflict was eventually resolved only when an enquiry committee of the thirteen 
associations, led by Stephen Yong and Ong Kee Hui, decided in the students’ favour 
to call for the principal to resign on 27 April. Yong, a lawyer, and Ong, a businessman 
from the preeminent Ong clan were the future Secretary-General and Chairman of the 
Sarawak United People’s Party. Unfazed by their success, the students’ delegation 




 Why did this strike succeed? One major factor was SLL’s behind-the-scenes 
organization, which ensured the strike remained under control and striking students 
united throughout the struggle. SLL’s cell system that Wen Ming Chyuan controlled 
was put to trial. At the very top end of the hierarchy stood Wen and Wang Fuk Ing, 
both of whom had by then left the Kuching CHMS. To orchestrate the strike, Wen 
and Wang held frequent meetings with other SLL members, who were still in 
school.66 Under Wen and Wang were two separate cells with distinct duties. The first 
consisted of Bong Kee Chok and Lai Jieyuan, charged with coordinating ‘Open Front’ 
work. Bong subsequently headed the ‘eight-man delegation’. Bong Kee Siaw and 
Chen Jinmei led the second cell, which was tasked to coordinate the ‘clandestine 
organisation’ among the students.67 Other key SLL members such as Tan Lee Seng, 
Fong Moi Kee and Ang Cho Teng managed their individual classes or standards from 
the underground, presumably coordinated by Kee Siaw’s cell.68 That SLL was in full 
control of the conflict from the start can be demonstrated by the fact that the two 
monitors of Class B, Junior Middle Two (Lower), who started the standoff with their 
criticism of the Mathematics teacher, had joined a study cell led by their classmate 
Tan Lee Seng. Zhang Benren, the third outspoken leader of the class, had been 
absorbed in SLL by Tan.69 Bong Kee Siaw claims that even the minority who did not 
participate in the strike were in fact following the orders of SLL in order to ‘keep an 
eye on the situation in school’.70 
 
 A second factor was SLL’s policy of maintaining the ‘masses’ line’, which 
meant sticking to the lowest common denominator public opinion could accept, while 
they made incremental tactical gains. Bong Kee Chok had a more concrete expression: 
always struggle ‘with good reason, with advantage and with restraint’ (有理有利有
节 ). 71  Having witnessed the October 29th strike spiral into a call for an end to 
colonialism, SLL leaders were scrupulous in finding sufficient cause for exploitation 
and to keep their aims within achievable limits. For example, SLL had rescinded an 
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earlier attempt to exploit the principal’s sex scandal in late 1954 when it was decided 
there was no strong basis for a strike.72 When the strike broke out on 30 March, the 
students stuck to the consistent line that they had a legitimate concern for the inferior 
teaching methods of their Mathematics teacher, and made the consistent demand to 
replace the principal who had blatantly ignored their supposedly well-founded anxiety. 
The students were careful not to tread on the toes of the colonial state so the conflict 
remained to be resolved within the Chinese community. With the principal’s attitude 
proving intransigent and his reputation already soiled by the earlier scandal, it was a 
short step from his loss of favour. SLL had, in essence, inched closer to its ultimate 
revolutionary goals by striving for interim objectives that could and did win the 
sympathies of the Chinese public.73 This pragmatic approach to politics would set the 
pattern for its political leadership in subsequent years. 
 
 The goal, as Wen Ming Chyuan would recall, was to ‘set our hands free to 
mobilise the masses [and] actively launch the revolution’. The real objective, hence, 
did not lie in ousting the principal but in politicising their fellow students in the 
Kuching CHMS through the activities that were organised during the forty-seven day 
period. Bong Kee Chok recalls: 
 
During the strike, we organised many study cells: the seniors tutored 
the juniors, lessons continued, and our studies were hence not affected 
by the strike. On the other hand, after the lessons ended, of course [we] 
told some revolutionary stories and learnt some revolutionary theories. 
The basic one was about life’s philosophy: what is man’s purpose on 
earth? At that time, the whole world was rife with waves of student, 
labour and national independence movements. That was the 
atmosphere, without which honestly speaking we could not have 
organised ourselves. At that time Singapore’s and Malaya’s student 
movements were also developing quickly, they were everywhere. We 
(Sarawak) were not far behind….we learnt from Singapore. In this way 
the movement was galvanised. It was through holding these activities 
that we trained a large batch of cadres.74 
 
                                                 
72 Interview with Bong Kee Chok, 5-6.1.2007. See also Liu, Twenty Years, p. 145 and Li, ‘Stormy 
Times (42): 30 March Students’ Strike (1)’ in SIT, 30.8.2006.  
73 Stephen Yong’s (chairman of the enquiry committee) account of the incident, for example, indicates 
his complete ignorance of the clandestine organization behind the student strikers at that time. See 
Yong, A Memoir, pp. 134-5. 
74 Interview with Bong Kee Chok, 5-6.1.2007. 
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While Bong set the direction of the movement from the ‘open front’ of the 
organisation, Fong Moi Kee mobilised her peers from inside the classrooms: 
 
I was allocated to work on my class: short excursions, taught them to 
sing, dance and gave them tuition. Tuition was the most important as 
studies were not to be neglected. So through these cultural activities, 
singing progressive songs, mass dancing, telling stories, playing team 
games, we enlivened their spirits, strengthened their confidence, so that 
the team of strikers would not gradually disperse, we stuck together 
from start to end. Through cultural activities we organised and 
communicated. Then we made regular reports, the results of our 
student delegation’s negotiation, once we obtained news, we discussed 
it with our classmates.75 
 
By late 1955, it began to dawn on SLL’s leaders that the number of students 
who had ‘turned progressive’ far exceeded all expectations. More than 1100 strikers 
took part in the strike. Yet until their grasp of Marxist-Leninist theories were 
enhanced and their commitment to ‘revolution’ tested, it would be risky to absorb all 
into SLL at once. SLL leaders hence devised a compromise solution in the latter half 
of 1955: to organise them through a satellite organisation – the Sarawak Advance 
Youth Association (砂拉越先进青年会，SAYA).76 The SAYA adopted the same 
triangular cell structure and disciplinary code and was put directly under the 
leadership of SLL members. All referred to themselves as ‘O’ members, for 
‘Organisation’, though SAYA members were kept in the dark about SLL. Like in SLL, 
SAYA members had to swear to strive for the ‘democracy and freedom’ of Sarawak, 
learn the ‘theories and principle of Marxism/Leninism and the ideology of Mao Tse 
Tung’ and offer their ‘whole li[ves] without the slightest hesitation’ to the 
revolution.77  
 
 Success in the strike also confirmed Bong Kee Chok’s place as the number 
two and ‘open front’ leader in SLL. Born in Sarawak in 1935, he grew up in a Hakka 
peasant family after the war in a village on the 29th Mile of Simanggang Road. Left-
wing politics for him was not an intellectual choice but one determined by his birth 
into a Hakka peasant family (as opposed to his right-wing schoolmates with landlord 
                                                 
75 Interview with Fong Moi Kee, 16.1.2007. 
76 Interview with Bong Kee Siaw, 5-6.1.2007. 
77 ‘Form of Oath of Admittance’ in Hardy, Danger Within, p. 56. 
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origins in China), whose members were engaged in clandestine anti-Japanese 
activities during the occupation. Descending on Kuching to further his secondary 
education at the CHMS in 1949, Bong was immediately initiated into the world of 
left-wing literature and student activism as described in the first chapter. When Wen 
Ming Chyuan approached him to join SLL in late 1953, he readily agreed because it 
was an honour to be invited.78 His emergence to head the student delegation indicates 
Bong had been groomed for ‘open front’ activities. Wen had probably recognised his 
rousing public speaking skills and sharp political instincts early on. Bong’s open 
leadership of the students brought him into contact with the chairpersons of the 
enquiry committee, Stephen Yong and Ong Kee Hui. Bong would work for a year as a 




Their handling of the two students’ strikes of the Kuching CHMS, occurring 
less than four years apart from each other, underscored how the radical students had 
come to terms with the reality of fighting colonialism with their idealism, wits and 
bare hands. It was with sheer tenacity and belief in the cause of revolution that Wen 
Ming Chyuan, with the help of Teo Yong Jim, revived the revolutionary organisation 
within three years of its comprehensive defeat by the British colonial government. 
The success of the 30 March Strike created the 1955 generation of Sarawak 
revolutionaries. The strike proved not only the efficiency of the ‘organisation’, but 
political maturity of SLL in manipulating public opinion to their side. In Communist 
parlance, they had found the “masses’ line”. The next chapter analyses how SLL took 
the “masses’ line” and the anti-colonial struggle beyond the walls of their school and 
into society.  
 
                                                 
78 Interview with Bong Kee Chok, 5-6.1.2007. 
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Chapter Four 
From Minzu to Nation: the Making of the United Front, 1956-63 
  
The previous chapter showed how Kuching’s radical students imported a 
revolutionary organisation, whose operational competence was then successfully 
experimented in a student’s strike in March 1955. SLL systematically organised the 
hundreds of students who were radicalised in the strike into a satellite organisation – 
the SAYA. The period 1956-62, during which SLL/SAYA operated its ‘united front’, 
remains the best documented period in the history of Sarawak Communism. Scholars 
have argued that the success of the Communist united front in this period was built on 
the twin foundations of Communist organisation and Chinese communalism.1 In this 
chapter, I argue that rather than communalism, it was minzu-nationalism combined 
with Communist leadership that accounted for the movement’s rapid ascendance 
among Sarawak peoples. The introduction of racial politics with the imposition of the 
grand merger plan of ‘Malaysia’ increasingly narrowed the range of choices available 
for the SLL and eventually led it onto the route of violent revolution in late 1962. 
 
4.1 Laying the (Under)Groundwork, 1956-9 
 
 From the success of the 30 March 1955 Strike emerged the core leaders who 
would marshal the united front over the next seven years. Wen Ming Chyuan’s 
position at the top of SLL remained unchallenged. Bong Kee Chok’s deft political 
showmanship and effective organisation during the strike, coupled with the fact that 
he had been ‘exposed’ to the public, paved the way for his subsequent career in open 
front party politics. He would be number two in SLL hierarchy. The third man in the 
hierarchy was Guo Weizhong (郭伟忠). Guo was a classmate of an early member of 
SLL, Bong Kee Siaw. They were in Class One of the Junior Middle Three standard 
during the 1955 strike. Bong Kee Siaw absorbed Guo into SLL around March 1955.2 
Some time in 1956, Guo was promoted to the Organisation Bureau of the Central 
Committee. Guo headed the labour movement for a year before passing it to Lim Ho 
                                                 
1 Hardy, Danger Within, pp. 4-46; Porritt, Communism in Sarawak, Chapters 2-4; Van der Kroef, 
‘Chinese Communism and Communalism’; Chin, Chinese Politics, Chapter Three. 
2 Interview with Bong Kee Siaw, 5-6.1.2007. 
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Kui in 1957.3 Between 1956 and 1959, he was also head of the students’ movement4 
and the 2nd Division Committee. From 1957 to 1962, Wen, Bong and Guo controlled 
the Organisation Bureau, which functioned as the equivalent of the Politburo in a 
communist party.5 
 
 Guo Weizhong, Wang Fuk Ing, Lin Yong Lun and Lim Ho Kui (林和贵) 
functioned as a second-tier cell within the Central Committee. It is not clear what 
other responsibilities Wang held, besides chairing the Third and Fourth Division 
Committees at various times.6 Ostensibly, she was a schoolteacher with the Kuching 
Chung Hwa Primary School (Number 3) after she graduated from the senior middle 
school in 1954. Lin Yong Lun was a contemporary of the SNYDL leaders during the 
1951 strike. Between 1952 and 1954, he became the Discipline Master at the 17th Mile 
Simmangang Road Chung Hwa Public School, an area known locally as ‘Little 
Yenan’. During a stand-off between the school’s directors and the colonial 
government over alleged communist indoctrination in late 1954, Lin actively 
orchestrated the school’s resistance from underground.7 Exactly when he joined SLL 
is unclear, but by 1956-7, he was in charge of the peasants’ movement – an indication 
of his years of experience in the countryside. Lim Ho Kui arrived late but rose quick 
in SLL hierarchy. Born in Kuching in 1936 to a Hokkien working class family, Lim 
could only afford his education through part-time work and scholarships he won with 
his excellent academic results. It was in 1955 when he met his junior middle three 
classmate, Guo Weizhong, that he first came in touch with left-wing literature. Guo 
would absorb Lim into the SAYA in mid-1955. Within four months, he was promoted 
into the SLL and put in charge of one-third of the underground students’ movement. 
By early 1957, Lim was promoted again to SLL’s ‘Central Committee’ as head of the 
labour movement and the 3rd Division Committee.8 This team would spearhead SLL’s 
‘united front’ policy between 1957 and June 1962.  
 
                                                 
3 Interview with Fong Moi Kee, 16.1.2007. Fong, who was his direct subordinate, in turn led the 
‘Labour Movement Core Directing Cell’ (工运核心领导小组) during the period 1956-1957. 
4 Interview with Bong Kee Siaw, 5-6.1.2007. Bong was a member of this committee. 
5 Interview with Lim Ho Kui, 7.3.2007. Lim used the term ‘Directing Cell’ (领导小组) for this group. 
It was most likely the ‘Organisation Bureau of the National Central Committee’ referred to in Hardy, 
Danger Within, p. 25.  
6 Interviews with Ang Cho Teng, 25.1.2007, and Tan Lee Seng, 27.2.2007. 
7 Interview with Voon Chang Liew, 31.1.2007. Voon was a 17th Mile local who was taught by Lin.  
8 Interview with Lim Ho Kui, 7.3.2007. 
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 With its position in Kuching secured by 1957, SLL began to pay more 
attention to its organisation in Sibu and Miri. Like Kuching before 1956, SLL’s 
presence in Sibu and Miri was limited to Chinese middle schools. In both towns, SLL 
members in Chinese middle schools instigated boycotts in 1956 but failed to mobilise 
their school mates on as widespread a scale as their Kuching counterparts as they 
suffered relatively poor leadership and a colonial government more determined to put 
down student unrest after 30 March 1955. In consequence, SLL’s leadership in Sibu 
and Miri had become fragmented and their followers despondent by 1957. In this 
context, SLL despatched two of its top cadres – Ang Cho Teng and Tan Lee Seng – to 
Sibu and Miri respectively. Both Tan and Ang had been inducted into SLL in its early 
years and were senior leaders by the time of the 1955 strike. Ang set sail for Sibu in 
November 1957, and upon arrival found the remnant SLL members split into different 
factions. By early 1959, Ang had consolidated the students’ movement, infiltrated the 
local trade unions, and instituted a rigorous and systematic scheme of indoctrination. 
Sometime in mid-1958, Tan moved to Miri, where he concentrated on strengthening 
the students’ movement.9  
 
 Besides the students’ movement, a particularly effective arm of SLL’s ‘united 
front’ was the labour movement headed by Lim Ho Kui. One of the reasons for Lim’s 
nomination to head the labour movement might have been his proletariat origins. 
Lim’s father was a stevedore at the Kuching Wharf, while his mother worked as a 
cleaner for the colonial watering hole - the Sarawak Club. During his school days and 
despite winning scholarships, Lim had to take on several odd-jobs to make ends meet. 
He was hence familiar with the demands and needs of the working class. From 
1956,10 SLL/SAYA members graduating from the Kuching CHMS began to infiltrate 
the Kuching trade unions as secretaries and clerks. Occupying the administrative posts 
enabled SLL/SAYA members to exert influence over trade union policies. From 
behind the scenes, Lim Ho Kui steered the labour movement in four directions. First, 
Lim made the material needs of the workers top priority for the unions: pushing for 
shorter working hours, negotiating better wages, and providing unemployment 
benefits and funeral services. Second, SLL/SAYA members introduced cultural 
activities to educate and entertain the workers. These activities ranged from choral 
                                                 
9 Interviews with Ang Cho Teng, 25.1.2007, and Tan Lee Seng, 27.2.2007. 
10 But according to Hardy, Danger Within, p. 15, SLL started infiltrating trade unions in 1954.  
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singing, mass dancing, to free education in the Trade Unions Free Night School 
(est.1959). Third, he presided over a period of expansion and consolidation. One of 
the most powerful unions at this time was the newly overhauled Kuching Employees’ 
and Labourers’ Union (est. 1957, KELU), which represented more than 1,600 Chinese 
shop-house assistants by 1959. Last and most important, Lim instituted two 
communications systems – one official, the other underground – modelled after the 
pyramidal hierarchy of SLL/SAYA. Through the underground network, workers were 
initiated into the revolutionary world of SLL/SAYA. At its peak, according to SLL’s 
estimates, the labour movement controlled more than 4,000 workers in the capital city, 
a stand-by army ready to be mobilised whenever numbers and manpower were 
needed.11  
 
 Hence, by mid-1959, SLL/SAYA had firmly consolidated its organisation in 
the three major cities of Sarawak. Each central committee member assumed on 
average two portfolios: a particular branch of ‘united front’ work and a particular 
Division Committee. Each division was in turn divided into various sub-areas and 
towns, which were managed by area/town committees. On these sat no more than four 
members, each charged with a particular aspect of united front work (students, labour, 
party, etc.). These cells spread downwards like a pyramid into the deepest and most 
remote corners of society. From the central committee, directives and new learning 
materials were disseminated down the hierarchy while reports of ground conditions 
were regularly passed upwards. The organisation multiplied with such tenacity that 
when its full extent was uncovered in the early 1960s, the colonial Information 
Officer charged with writing a book about it almost called it the ‘Cancer Within’.12 
 
 While SLL/SAYA had secured critical footholds in public institutions, 
especially those in the cities, they had yet to acquire a mass following among the 
population. The attempt to capture this crowd started on 1 August 1956 when Lin 
Guixing, Tay Chok Chong, Chan Siaw Hee and Chin Shaw Tung founded Sarawak’s 
                                                 
11 Interviews with Lim Ho Kui, 7.3.2007; Fong Moi Kee, 16.1.2007; Chan Boon Ho, Lam Wan Shin 
and Tan Choon Hock, 8.1.2007. The Sibu labour movement was equally popular, active and organised 
under Ang Cho Teng’s and Mr. Ho’s leadership. Interviews with Ang Cho Teng, 25.1.2007 and Mr. Ho, 
21.1.2007. 
12 Alistair Morrison, Fair Land Sarawak: some recollections of an expatriate official (Ithaca, New 
York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993), p. 121. 
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first left-wing Chinese medium, local-oriented newspaper, the Sin Wen Pau (SWP).13 
Wen Ming Chyuan, the leader of SLL, then joined SWP as editor of the international 
news desk in December 1956. Wen would have the major say in editorial policy from 
1957 to June 1960, when he moved on to assume the post of SUPP’s Propaganda and 
Education Secretary. He was succeeded by Yap Choon Ho, who had been a key 
member of the student delegation during the 30 March 1955 strike. In early 1957, 
Bong Kee Siaw received orders to absorb him directly into SLL, leapfrogging the 
stage of apprenticeship in the SAYA.14  Upon his graduation from senior middle 
school in June 1957, Yap entered SWP and would assume its editorship after Wen’s 
departure in 1959. 15  Many more SLL/SAYA members would enter SWP in 
subsequent years as writers, editors, print workers and even delivery boys. Not only 
did SWP function as a mouthpiece of SLL, its premises also served as a meeting place 
where the older generation leftist shareholders such as Chan Siaw Hee and Chin Shaw 
Tung interacted with Wen and his youthful charges, and where major political issues 
were debated, then editorialised. SWP was a virtual intellectual salon of Sarawak’s 
socialist revolution.16  
 
4.2 From the Foundations of Discrete Minzu  
 
 That the left-wing Chinese aimed to make a clean break with the ‘Chinese 
sojourner’ mentality of the past was unashamedly declared in its mission statement on 
its maiden issue of SWP: 
 
The result of detaching culture from its minzu system and the 
continuous growth of the particular minzu culture, is increasing 
divisiveness between minzu and minzu. Hence the arduous long term 
task of the cultural circles is not only to develop our own minzu culture, 
                                                 
13 Lin and another editor had crossed over from the right-wing Chung Hwa Daily. It should be recalled 
that Tay was a SNDYL leader in the October 1951 strike; Chan had dabbled in Wu Chan’s Anti-Fascist 
SLL during the war; Chin, one of the Anti-Fascist SLL leaders, was the so-called ‘Director of the 
underground education department’. These were the major share-holders of the newspaper. See Chan, 
A Memoir, pp. 56-60. Tay was to be deported under the ‘Undesirable Persons Ordinance’ on 8 
December 1956 as the Special Branch ‘suspected (he was the) Head of the subversive activities in the 
First and Second Divisions’. TNA: CO 1030/242: SBIPIR, November 1956. 
14 Interview with Bong Kee Siaw, 5-6.1.2007. 
15 Liyun, Reminiscing (Hong Kong: Tien-ma Publishing Ltd., 2003), p. 9. The author is Yap’s widow. 
16 Chan, A Memoir, pp. 56-60. This early alliance forged between the old and young leftists at SWP 
would later on be replicated in the leadership of SUPP, steering it in a militant leftist direction and 
deterring the moderates (Stephen Yong and Ong Kee Hui) from deviating towards the centre until 1970.  
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but more important, is to support and assist in normalising the growth 
of all minzu cultures, that is to bring about the harmony of the three 
major minzu (Chinese, Malay, Dayak) and the unity of the three major 
minzu.17  
 
 Yet SWP, being published in the Chinese medium, was aware of its 
inaccessibility to the other peoples of Sarawak. Hence, the ‘concrete’ short-term 
mission was confined to the ‘responsibilities it had to bear towards ethnic Chinese 
culture and the Chinese sojourner society’: 
 
To open up a land of happiness for the bitter labouring masses, to lead 
the bitter labouring masses in the search for freedom and joy, to assist 
the labouring masses in uplifting their living standards, to publicise the 
demands of the masses, to organise cultural circles, and to nurture 
young writers… until now, no other publication has raised or paid 
attention to these problems…18 
 
The mass appeal of this paradigm shift in Chinese political orientation was 
evident in the rising circulation of the newspaper. SWP quickly gained a First 
Division-wide readership as distribution centres were set up on the 3rd, 7th and 10th 
Mile along the Kuching-Serian Road. Newspaper distribution was aided by the fact 
that one of its proprietors, Chan Siaw Hee, was also the major shareholder of the 
Sarawak Transport Company – a 160-bus fleet plying Sarawak’s First and Second 
Divisions. Both Wen Ming Chyuan and Chin Shaw Tung also became minor 
shareholders.19 The daily distribution of newspapers to rural Sarawak was a revolution 
in itself. Day-to-day newspaper reading, hitherto the privilege of the urban elite, now 
became accessible to the rural masses. To further widen the readership to the Third 
and Fourth Divisions, SLL established Min Chong Pao and Sa Min Pao in Sibu (25 
April 1960) and Miri (11 February 1961) respectively. At its peak, the three papers 
had a combined circulation of 7000 copies daily.20 While the figure works out to a 
readership of one in ten Chinese-literate people,21 the actual readership must be many 
times higher for newspapers were not only circulated within the family but in public 
                                                 
17 ‘On the Mission of SWP’ in: A Collection of Sin Wen Pao Editorials (Kuching: Sin Wen Pau, 1962), 
p. 1. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Chan, A Memoir, pp. 47-55.  
20 Hardy, Danger Within, p. 36-7.  
21 There were 69,572 Chinese literate people in 1960. Jones, 1960 Population Census, p. 81. 
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places such as coffee-shops, grocery stores and youth clubs.22 The combination of 
synchronised editorial policies, ready capital, a disciplined workforce and an efficient 
distribution network created an ‘imagined community’ of shared interests among the 
Sarawak Chinese.23 
 
Then in 1958, Wen Ming Chyuan himself set about reaching out to the Dayak 
peasantry when a Minzu Works Sub-Committee was set up under the Central 
Committee in 1958.24 Committee members included Bong Kee Chok, his wife Lui 
How Ying (雷皓莹), and Yap Choon Ho. The seniority of the cadres appointed to this 
department, and Wen’s personal direction, indicated SLL’s emphasis on integrating 
the Dayak peasantry into the ‘united front’.  The committee spent several days 
surveying the First Division border region with Indonesia and a policy was devised by 
1959. This survey seemed to have persuaded the Sub-Committee that real ‘historical’ 
barriers, which they attributed to the colonial policy of ‘divide and rule’, existed 
between the Chinese cadres and the Dayak peasantry. The policy was hence for minzu 
cadres to simply live among the Dayaks, familiarise themselves with Dayak culture, 
try to gain their trust, and indoctrinate them with socialist theories when the 
opportunity arose. Some of the best cadres in the Kuching CHMS were hand-picked 
for minzu works training, 25  which included learning theories relating to minzu 
problems, some rudiments of the Iban/Bidayuh languages and life skills such as 
rubber tapping, hairdressing, watch-repairing, and basic medical skills. As plans for 
starting a political party gathered pace in 1959, Wen, Bong and Yap left the 
committee to the charge of Guo Weizhong, Lui How Ying, Liu Zijin (刘紫金) and 
Zhang Benren (张本仁). The highly centralised organisational structure of this branch 
of the ‘united front’ works indicated its significance to overall SLL policy: whereas 
other branches in the ‘united front’ such as labour, students and the political party 
                                                 
22 Interview with Tan Lee Seng, 27.1.2007. Tan, for example, read his left-wing newspapers at the 
family sundry store. Interview with Lui How Ming, 10.1.2007. Lui read his radical newspapers at a 
photo studio in Miri. Youth clubs were another major venue where people went to read newspapers. 
23 Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
24 Information in this paragraph, unless otherwise footnoted, is based on Huai Yuan, ‘Minzu Work in 
the early period’ and Yang Chuan Xing, ‘Reviewing the initiation of minzu works in the First and 
Second Divisions’ in In Search of Footprints in the Land of Natives (Bintulu: Yu Chin Lük, 2007), pp. 
57-76. Yang claims the Sub-Committee was set up a year earlier in 1957. 
25 Interview with Bong Kee Siaw, 5-6.1.2007. Bong Kee Siaw who was on the Student Movement’s 
Committee remembers nominating school cadres to the minzu works department. 
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were subsumed under the individual Divisional Committees, minzu works cells in the 
field reported directly to the Kuching-based Sub-Committee.  
 
In this way, when the 1955 Chinese middle school generation left school, they 
became human carriers of a revolutionary network, extending it to wherever their new 
careers brought them. Some had their career choices dictated by the needs of the 
revolution. The minzu cadres left the comfort of the cities for the upriver longhouses 
(especially along the Rejang and Baram), disguised as barbers, entrepreneurs, 
mechanics or even peasants. Others followed the traditional career paths of Chinese 
middle school graduates and ended up as clerks, teachers and business apprentices. 
Yet all were revolutionaries, setting up secret study cells wherever their work took 
them in order to propagate visions of a new Sarawak to the masses. By 1959, with the 
extension of SLL/SAYA network across most of Sarawak, the stage was set for an 
open contest for the power to re-define the nation fundamentally. 
 
4.3 Towards A United People’s Party 
 
The Chinese society is the most stratified, followed by the Malays, 
while the Dayaks have no such obvious stratifications. The capital-
owning bankers, trading firm bosses and other entrepreneurs can be 
categorised as the nationalist bourgeoisie (The Chinese are in the 
absolute majority among those in this class, but we have no reason to 
consider them as the nationalist bourgeoisie of that particular race [i.e. 
British]); those who run small businesses or such people as hawkers 
are categorised as the ‘petit bourgeoisie’, within this class are further 
divisions by wealth, the poorer petit bourgeoisie are in the absolute 
majority; the working class in Sarawak is considered a smaller class at 
present. The special characteristics and contradictions between these 
classes need not be explained here.  
 
Among the class of peasantry, the Dayaks are in the absolute majority, 
(they have almost no class division among themselves, all of them 
being peasants) followed by the Chinese and the Malay peasants. The 
challenge of Sarawak’s peasantry is in reality a minzu problem, both of 
which cannot be treated separately. The internal division within this 
class is simpler and hence easier to handle.26 
 
 Wen Ming Chyuan’s 1958 New Year’s Day SWP editorial ended with an 
important message: the time was ripe for the founding of a political party in Sarawak 
                                                 
26 Sin Wen Pao Editorials, p. 5. 
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to lead the struggle for independence.27 The message revealed Wen’s early intention 
to form a united front of all ethnic groups and social classes in an anti-British political 
front. The assessments made regarding the Dayak groups were that as a peasant class, 
they would be ‘revolutionary’ in their nature and that their slowness to mobilise was 
due essentially to a minzu problem. What was this minzu problem? It should be 
recalled that the initial survey in 1958 by the Minzu Works Committee had revealed 
insurmountable linguistic and cultural barriers between the Dayaks and SLL’s 
Chinese cadres, hence negating the option of infiltrating the longhouses more directly. 
The assumption made by Wen was that once the linguistic and cultural barriers had 
been breached, the Dayak peoples could be easily won over. An open political party, 
where mobilisation of the Dayak masses could take place freely and openly, would be 
SLL’s answer to the minzu barrier. 
 
It was in this context that Wen agreed to Chan Siaw Hee’s and Stanley Wong 
Cheng Ting’s (黄增霆，from Sibu) proposals for the formation of Sarawak’s first 
political party some time in 1958.28 Wen’s objective would be revealed more clearly 
in an internal SLL/SAYA document, ‘On the Formation of an Open Political Party 
and the Struggle for Independence’, circulated one year later, in early 1959. This 
document argued that SLL had hitherto been ‘unable to break out and adopt a higher 
form to mobilise the masses’. With a political party, it would be able to mobilise the 
masses openly and struggle for independence. Finally, the document asserted that 
workers and farmers should play the leading role in the party, but admitted that ‘the 
propertied class’ would have ‘more influence…in the early stages’.29  
 
By the time the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP) was founded on 4 June 
1959, some four years of preparatory work had gone into consolidating SLL’s control 
of the grassroots. It was with the unspoken blessing of SLL/SAYA machinery that the 
ostensibly ‘propertied class’ members of the SUPP Central Committee built a multi-
racial mass party almost overnight. One SUPP branch stood out over the rest – the 
Kuching Branch – which was administratively led by its Secretary Bong Kee Chok, 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 Chan, A Memoir, pp. 119-125. This Chinese-educated group then approached the English-educated 
moderates, Stephen Yong and Ong Kee Hui, the latter especially for his contacts with the indigenous 
Council Negri members. See Yong, Memoir, pp. 155-9 and Ong, Memoirs, 421-5. 
29 Hardy, Danger Within, pp. 25-27. 
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with Wen Ming Chyuan joining as an ordinary Branch Committee member. Under the 
leadership of Bong, SUPP founded Kuching sub-branches in Matang, 24th Mile 
(Simanggang Road), Batu Kawa, 7th Mile, 10th Mile, 17th Mile, Nonok and Pangkalan 
Ampat, all eight within the first year.30 Overall party membership rose from 3,627 in 
1959 to 46,471 in 1962, almost half of whom were non-Chinese.31 Various authors 
have discussed the subject of ‘Communist’ infiltration in or Chinese ‘Communalist’ 
dominance of SUPP.32 Yet to the grassroots participants, the movement created an 
unprecedented, and indeed unsurpassed, historical moment when inter-ethnic political 
intercourse was no longer the privilege of the elite but had become a popular, day-to-
day phenomenon. Pictures of mass rallies, anniversary carnivals, and branch meetings 
that survive from the period show seas of heads and thousands of raised fists, amidst 
what must have been deafening echoes of ‘Sa’ati’ (SUPP party slogan: literally ‘one 
heart’). The formation of branches, which involved the election of local leaders to 
branch positions and regular meetings, penetrated SUPP’s political message into the 
grassroots.  
 
4.4 The Communalisation of Sarawak Politics 
 
The prospect of a Chinese-led and Communist-infiltrated multi-racial mass-
based political party jolted the Sarawak colonial government into reaction. In fact, 
from July 1955, the colonial Chief Secretary, John Ellis, and then Governor Anthony 
Abell had encouraged and helped Ong Kee Hui persuade the unofficial Council Negri 
members to form a multi-racial political party. But, as Ong speculates, Abell 
withdrew his endorsement sometime in February 1959, causing Temenggong Jugah 
(Paramount Chief of the Rejang Ibans) to become wary of SUPP.33 Abell then went 
public with his concern on 28 May 1959, a week before SUPP was founded: 
 
                                                 
30 Chua Chung Toi, Teng L.C. David, Sim Kheng Hwee, Bong Kee Lin, The Story of SUPP (Kuching: 
Research and Resource Centre SUPP Headquarters, 1989), pp. 143-4. 
31 Sarawak United People’s Party Historical Materials, To Grow in Struggle, Tuan Jie Bao Special 
Edition, 15, 1959-1962 (Kuching: Organ of SUPP, 1962), p. 73. In Michael Leigh’s study of political 
party formation in Sarawak, he concludes that the ‘SUPP, though recruiting many Dayaks throughout 
the state, is Chinese controlled’. Only 4 sub-branches out of 52 branches and sub-branches were not 
controlled by Chinese. See Leigh, Rising Moon, pp. 17 and 21. 
32 Chin, Chinese Politics, p. 51; Porritt, Communism in Sarawak, chapter 4.  
33 Ong, Memoirs¸ pp. 416-422. 
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It is…essential that politics should not cause any further divisions in 
our community but should have a unifying and binding effect. If a 
party tends to be dominated by one race or class…it may have a 
disintegrating effect on our community…I frankly doubt if political 
parties at the present stage of development will spell faster progress in 
this small country.34 
 
The colonial government’s intervention set the tone for the stereotyping of SUPP as a 
Chinese political party and prevented more prominent native leaders from joining it. 
In fact the government gave tacit endorsement to the subsequent formation of parties 
driven by ethnic interests. Abang Haji Mustapha, the Datu Bandar and a government 
civil servant, was given three months leave to start the Party Negara Sarawak 
(PANAS) in April 1960. The primary aim of the party was ‘to protect, safeguard, 
support, foster and promote the political, educational, religious, economic, social and 
cultural interests of the indigenous people of Sarawak particularly and of the Ra’ayat 
of Sarawak generally’. 35 As Michael Leigh comments, ‘(t)he very name of PANAS, 
literally translated as ‘the party of the state of Sarawak’, had an official ring – in 
contrast to SUPP, which had placed its stress upon being the united people’s party’.36 
Sarawak would witness the founding of four more communal parties in the next three 
years. 
 
It was in this racially charged climate that the colonial government began 
moves to convert all state aided Chinese middle schools to the English medium. 
Declassified British files show that when the colonial government first offered 
funding aids to the hitherto private Chinese schools through the Grant Code in 1956, 
the entire system had already been identified as a target for control and change. In 
October 1954, Abell wrote to the Colonial Office to state his case for the planned 
additional expenditure on Chinese schools: 
 
I am satisfied that the extent and character of anti-British feeling 
among young Chinese, and the extent to which the loyalties of the 
Peking Government have been substituted for the local loyalties which 
have so happily characterized the attitude of the Overseas Chinese in 
Sarawak for many generations, is infinitely greater than any previous 
developments of this kind. There is now developing in Sarawak a 
                                                 
34 Leigh, Rising Moon, p. 14. 
35 Object no. 1 of the PANAS constitution, quoted from ibid., p. 27. 
36 Ibid.  
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dangerous form of hostility to the territory’s established Government 
and the hub and centre of the activities which create this hostility is the 
Chinese School system.37  
 
Yet Chinese demand for education, fuelled by the post-war baby boom, far exceeded 
the state finances of the colonial government. In the three years after taking over 
Chinese school finances, the colonial government introduced various schemes to limit 
the growth of Chinese demand for education, culminating in the appointment of the 
David McLellan commission to recommend a final solution to Sarawak’s education 
problems. The 1959 McLellan Report ostensibly pointed to the need for reforms in 
Chinese middle schools due to their communal outlook, China-oriented curriculum, 
and its dislocation with the employment needs of the local economy.38  Yet in a 
separate note to the Colonial Office, McLellan revealed the underlying motive for the 
Chinese middle school reforms: 
 
It is necessary first of all to determine what the general policy is to be 
towards the Chinese community in general and Chinese education in 
particular, since it is only amongst the Chinese that there is any 
noticeable attraction to Communism. Is it to be repressive or 
constructive?...For obvious reasons no Colonial Government could 
even consider general repressive measures against the Chinese 
community but a case might be made for direct action against their 
predominantly alien education system…39 
 
In December 1960, Governor Alexander Waddell adopted McLellan’s 
recommendations. Introducing the ‘National Education Plan’ in the Council Negri, he 
argued that ‘multi-racial schools can only function satisfactorily if there is a common 
medium of instruction’, citing the negative example of Chinese schools, which 
‘automatically excludes children of all other races’.40 The bill threatened to withdraw 
funding to schools that refused to convert their teaching medium to the English 
language. In January 1961, the Chinese middle school managements were given four 
months to take a stand or lose state funding. Writers who label Chinese resistance to 
the ‘Ten Year Conversion Plan’ as a sign of ‘cultural chauvinism’ and ‘communist 
instigation’ tend to ignore this political context under which the ‘Conversion Plan’ 
                                                 
37 TNA: PRO CO 1030/267: Abell to Boyd, 22.10.1954. 
38 D. McLellan, Report on Secondary Education 1959, Sarawak (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 
1960). 
39 TNA: PRO CO 1030/422: ‘Notes of on Subversion in Sarawak Schools’, 6.11.1959. 
40 A Guide to Education in Sarawak (Kuching: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 54-5. 
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was shoved down the throat of the Chinese community.41 It was essentially a plan to 
buy out the sixty-year old private school system with four years of state funding, the 
finances of which in any case had been drawn mainly from taxing Chinese economic 
activities.  
   
The coordinated response from the ‘united front’ was on one hand to articulate 
and defend its conception of minzu-nationalism for post-colonial Sarawak’s education 
system, and on the other to steel up the school managements’ resolve to resist the 
‘conversion plan’ through the organisation of mass meetings. SWP argued that ‘the 
same set of principles that reinforces Sarawak nationalism can be taught in different 
language-medium schools, to inform children from every race that the children and 
adults of other races are just like their own siblings and parents, who need our care 
and concern’.42  Min Chong Pao went further to question the choice of selecting 
English as the common or national language. Instead it argued that ‘those who knew 
English were in the absolute minority in this country; [those who advocated 
conversion] also fail to recognise that a common language should be selected from 
among the three major races [Chinese, Malay, Dayak] of this country...A genuine 
national system or common language could only be decided by a self-governing and 
independent people, on the basis of equality and mutual-benefit’. The editorial 
concluded that ‘nationalisation’ of schools at the present moment was equivalent to a 
second round of ‘colonisation’.43  
 
As the debates on the proposed ‘conversion’ of Chinese schools raged on, 
another bombshell was dropped on 27 May 1961, when the prime minister of the 
Federation of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, announced that he was favourable to 
plans to form a ‘Greater Malaysia’ consisting of Malaya, Singapore and the British 
Borneo Territories – Sarawak, Brunei and North Borneo. It was widely known that 
the Borneo Territories had only been included in ‘Greater Malaysia’ to entice the 
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Tunku into accepting Singapore, with its left-wing politics and overwhelmingly 
Chinese population.44 The whole top-down and racially deterministic approach to the 
creation of Malaysia clashed with the principles of democratic ‘self-determination’ 
and minzu equality that SUPP had championed from its inauguration. Historian 
Matthew Jones has shown that although the local expatriate officials in Sarawak were 
up in their arms against the timing and terms of handing Sarawak over to Kuala 
Lumpur, it was British interests as seen from the imperial metropolis that prevailed 
eventually. In a briefing to cabinet ministers in October 1961, Duncan Sandys, the 
Commonwealth Secretary, conceded that:  
 
[The need to include Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei in Malaysia] 
presented the British Government with a difficult problem of timing as 
the Borneo Territories were far from ready for such an association: in 
the last analysis we must do what we thought right about that and not 
simply abide by local opinion in Borneo, but it would be important to 
carry local opinion with us and the Tunku must be made to understand 
the need to do so… …45 
 
It was with this undeclared understanding that the British and Malayan governments 
later appointed the Cobbold Commission to ‘ascertain’ local opinion in Sarawak and 
North Borneo on 23 November 1961. This is not the place to dwell any further into 
the intricacies of the ‘Malaysia’ controversy. It will suffice to add that charges of 
Malaysia being a ‘neo-colonialist’ construction had its origins in the manner by which 
the universally affirmed right of democratic ‘self-determination’ of all peoples were 
blatantly brushed aside by the British and its local collaborators during the 
implementation of ‘Malaysia’.  
 
4.5 The Collapse of the Constitutional Struggle 
 
Confrontation between the left-wing United Front and the colonial 
government intensified as SLL consolidated its control of SUPP at its Second 
Delegates’ Congress in June 1960. Forty-one members were elected to the central 
                                                 
44 See M.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation, Political Unification in the 
Malaysia Region, 1945-1965 (Kuala Lumpur: University Malaya Press, 2005), Chapter Six.  
45 Quoted in Mathew Jones, “Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories and the 
Contours of British Policy, 1961-1963” in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 28, 
No. 2, May 2000. p. 90. 
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committee, in which a further fifteen were chosen for a Standing Committee to run 
the day-to-day affairs of the party. Wen Ming Chyuan was elected Propaganda and 
Education Secretary, while Bong Kee Chok a member of the Standing Committee. 
SLL’s increased presence in SUPP did not go unnoticed. According to a mid-July 
colonial intelligence review of the SUPP congress, ‘no less than nine of the Central 
Committee are known to be members or candidate members of the clandestine 
organisation’. Furthermore, of the eleven members of the Standing Committee who 
would ‘normally be available in Kuching, six are known communists’, and ‘(o)ne of 
these is the suspected leader of the organisation’. ‘The Communists have thus 
achieved a position whereby they can wield considerable influence on SUPP affairs 
and direction’. 46  On 26 July, the colonial government tabled a White Paper on 
‘Subversion in Sarawak’, which exposed a ‘relatively small but active secret 
Communist organisation which aims ultimately at the revolutionary overthrow of 
lawfully constituted government and its replacement by a Communist state’. This 
White Paper described the Communist penetration of Chinese schools and trade 
unions and suggested that the ‘emergence of political parties has introduced new 
opportunities for this organisation to carry on its organisation’.47 Yet the colonial 
government appeared, at this point, to have confused what was really the work of SLL 
with the ‘Borneo Communist Party’ (BCP) – the only organisation named in the entire 
document.48  
 
The publication of the White Paper prepared the public for a series of 
repressive measures the colonial government was now prepared to undertake against 
suspected Communists in particular, even if it could only be achieved at the cost of 
alienating the Chinese more generally. The idea that the BCP, rather than SLL, was 
behind the Communist subversion had emerged before the apprehension of Fu Tze-
man in Sibu for possession of Communist documents. But Fu’s arrest on 22 August 
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1960 must have confounded the colonial government over the true identity of this 
underground movement for one of the documents found in his possession was the 
‘Manifesto on the Establishment of the Borneo Communist Party’. Fu, a Kuching 
born Chinese, was in fact a SAYA member who had been despatched to Sibu, under 
the direction of Ang Cho Teng. He had obtained a copy of the BCP manifesto by 
chance and was charged for its possession (together with other Communist literature) 
under the ‘Undesired Persons Ordinance’.49 Stephen Yong’s law firm fought a highly 
publicised court case against the government’s use of the Undesirable Persons 
Ordinance to deport the local-born Fu. The trial went right to the heart of an ongoing 
debate about whether the Chinese enjoyed the same rights of citizenship by birth in 
the state of Sarawak as all other peoples. The court upheld its ruling and Fu was 
deported in late January 1961.50 A subsequent appeal to the Privy Council in February 
1961 was successful, and it prevented further use of the ‘Undesirable Persons 
Ordinance’ on suspected Chinese ‘communists’. Yet the political damage had been 
done, as Stephen Yong highlighted: ‘This case has made the local born non-native 
people feel that they [we]re only second-class citizens, their birth-rights 
meaningless’. 51  Other repressive measures followed. Between October 1961 and 
December 1962, the government passed no less than seven bills, in which the people’s 
freedom of movement, speech and association were severely restricted.52 
 
 Despite the colonial state’s increasing constriction of democratic liberties, 
SLL continued to stick to its course of ‘struggling’ against ‘Malaysia’ through 
constitutional means. This was most evident in April 1962, when underground 
members of the Party Rakyat Brunei (PRB) held a secret meeting with Wen Ming 
Chyuan to discuss the possibilities of joining forces in an armed revolt. The PRB had 
been founded in 1956 by Sheikh A. M. Azahari on the model of the left-wing Party 
Rakyat Malaya. Azahari had plans to revive the ancient Brunei sultanate that covered 
the three British Borneo Territories in a constitutional monarchy. While PRB and 
SUPP had official ties, this liaison had been initiated by the underground (‘Jalan 
Bawah’) PRB members, Hidup and Jhaffar through SUPP Miri Branch Secretary, Lui 
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How Ming. Lui then accompanied Wen to the meeting, which was held on the Canada 
Hill on the outskirts of Miri. According to Lui, Wen Ming Chyuan tried to dissuade 
the PRB from the uprising and on failing, expressed his opinion that SLL was not 
prepared for armed revolt and would not be so for another twenty years. The brief 
meeting then ended.53  
 
 Exactly what figured in Wen Ming Chyuan’s calculations over the next two 
months is a matter of much controversy and particular historical significance. Events 
show that Wen was prepared to stick to the ‘united front’ strategy, despite the severe 
curbs on the practice of constitutional democracy. During SUPP’s Third Delegates’ 
Congress (1-5 June 1962), even more SLL/SAYA members would penetrate the 
SUPP Central Committee. At least fourteen SLL/SAYA members were elected to the 
Central Committee, with a further six selected to the Standing Committee. The 
imposition of the ‘Malaysia’ plan, though repulsive to SLL’s nationalist agenda, had 
clearly not given Wen cause to think about subverting it through violence. Yet having 
known that the PRB was fermenting an ‘armed revolt’ in late 1962, it is difficult to 
understand why Wen failed to take any precautionary measures to protect SLL 
members. The only person to whom Wen confided this information was Bong Kee 
Chok,54 while Lui was instructed to keep the secret.55 From SLL’s perspective, Wen 
had perhaps judged that the people were not ready for armed struggle and hence was 
prepared for SLL open front leaders to suffer mass arrests as political detainee 
martyrs. Yet this will not cohere with Wen’s subsequent decision to revoke his 
Sarawak citizenship and accept deportation to China after he was detained on 22 June 
1962. Could it be that Wen simply neglected to think in strategic terms? 
 
 SLL’s deepening penetration of SUPP precipitated further action from the 
colonial government. Two weeks after the Third Delegates’ Conference, on 22 June 
1962, Chin Shaw Tung, Yuen Chun Toh (阮春涛), Wen Ming Chyuan, Bong Kee 
Chok, and the latter two’s wives, Wang Fuk Ing and Lui How Ying, were detained 
under the ‘Restricted Residence Order’ to various remote settlements. As Wang and 
Chin were China-born, the ‘Undesirable Persons Ordinance’ could be evoked to 
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55 Interview with Lui How Ming, 10.1.2007. 
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deport them. When given the option to leave Sarawak, the rest decided to join them in 
China. According to Bong, it was a strategic plan to ‘Leave by the front door, Return 
by the back’ (前门出、后门进).56 This ‘strategy’ was however not disseminated to 
SLL members. Hence, with the departure of Wen, Bong and Wang, SLL’s Central 
Committee was immediately depleted by half. Furthermore, Guo Weizhong had been 
exiled to North Borneo in early 1962 in a ‘rectification campaign’ for his criticisms of 
SLL’s lack of a more formal and bureaucratic structure. From late June 1962, SLL 
was left to the charge of the heads of the peasants’ and labour movement, Lin Yong 
Lun and Lim Ho Kui, both ignorant of the PRB’s plan for violent revolt.57 
 
 As the crisis deepened in the following month, with the detentions of another 
four ‘open’ SLL members in SUPP and trade unions, SLL began to look across the 
border for international assistance. In August and September, Boon Siak Fah (温锡
华), a SAYA Peasants’ Association member and secretary of the SUPP Tundong sub-
branch made two expeditions to West Kalimantan in the company of a Li Mayao (李
玛耀) and another ‘superior from Kuching’. The expeditions accomplished three 
objectives. First, upwards of twenty ‘surat penduduk’ (residential certificates) were 
obtained from the Partai Nasional Indonesia office and brought home to Sarawak. All 
travellers who intended to stay in Indonesia required these permits. Second, Boon’s 
superior established contacts with the Partai Kommunis Indonesia office at 
Pemangkat. Third, the routes that led to West Kalimantan had been reconnoitred. Lim 
Ho Kui also strengthened minzu works in the border regions.58 
 
 Within three days of the outbreak of the Brunei Revolt on 8 December 1962, 
Lin Yong Lun was detained along with twenty-five other SLL/SAYA members. 
According to Lim Ho Kui, moments after learning about Brunei’s uprising, he began 
to set his pen to paper to pass down the orders for SLL/SAYA to prepare for armed 
struggle. From Lim’s perspective, the constitutional path had been ‘blocked’, the 
Brunei Malays had risen and the Indonesians were assisting the anti-Malaysia forces. 
In January 1963, the first batch of Chinese youths would cross the border into 
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This thesis is an historical enquiry into the origins of the socialist revolution in 
Sarawak. Chapter Two suggests that the defeat of the Europeans in Asia and the 
merchant class Chinese kapitans’ failure to put up any form of resistance against the 
Japanese had de-legitimised the colonial system of indirect rule in the eyes of the left-
wing Chinese intelligentsia. These left-wing teachers and journalists, who maintained 
their clandestine network of resistance during the war, wanted to institute a more 
democratic system of governance and representation among the Chinese in Sarawak. 
When they were thwarted in their aims by the return of the British colonial 
government and the re-establishment of the ‘kapitan’ system in July 1946, it was to 
education and publishing which their attention would turn. No doubt the Communist 
victory in China gave a tremendous psychological boost to ‘communism’ in the 
political thinking of the Chinese youth in Sarawak, but this thesis argues that the 
radicalisation of the youth was the result of far deeper local social changes that 
occurred after the war: the creation of a single Chinese community through unified 
‘Chung Hwa Schools’, the massive expansion of post-war Chinese education and the 
consequent increase in literacy, and the proliferation of left-wing literature and print 
media in the region.  
 
A second gap in the historiography this thesis seeks to fill is the lack of 
knowledge about Sarawak’s first clandestine left-wing organisations and their early 
leaders’ aims and strategies. In Chapter Three, I demonstrate that Sarawak-oriented 
youths had gained control of the revolutionary movement in Kuching from as early as 
October 1951. A comparison of the two strike actions initiated by SNDYL and SLL in 
1951 and 1955 respectively shows that while both organisations were Sarawak-
oriented in their revolutionary goals, the latter proved better organised, more strategic 
in thinking, and hence more successful ultimately. It was through Wen Ming 
Chyuan’s vision, tenacity and strategic handling that the ‘revolution’, which had lost 
much steam after the colonial government’s 1952 Emergency crackdown, was fully 
restored by late 1955 as a mass movement among Kuching’s Chinese youth. It has 
seldom been mentioned that the 30 March 1955 students’ strike at the Kuching 
CHMS took place almost simultaneously as the Bandung Conference. At an 
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ideological and strategic level, the strike would have the same impact on students as 
the Conference had on emerging Afro-Asian nations: it claimed for them, amidst an 
increasingly polarised world, the basic and universal principles of independence and 
freedom for all peoples to decide their own fates. But more importantly, at the tactical 
level, the 30 March Strike determined the ‘masses line’ SLL/SAYA would follow in 
their attempt to mobilise the Sarawak peoples against colonialism. 
 
  Much has been made about the communalist and Communistic ends of SLL-
led revolution. Chapter Four suggests that SLL-led ‘united front’ was first and 
foremost a democratic mass movement that strove to realise their immediate goal of 
national liberation for a multi-minzu Sarawak. Viewed from the late colonial state’s 
nation-building imperatives, the Sarawak Chinese’s refusal to ‘assimilate’ does seem 
at first glance like a case of cultural chauvinism. Granted, the left-wing Chinese saw 
Chinese culture, most manifestly the private Chinese school system, as an integral 
part of the national culture they hoped would evolve in the new nation. Yet their 
opposition to the ‘Ten Year Conversion’ plan (to the English language) was, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter Four, motivated by their resistance to what they saw as 
colonial education rather than any wish to dominate other races culturally. The 
inconclusive debate on Sarawak’s national language or national model of education 
during the period 1960-1961 was further relegated to the sidelines when plans to form 
a super federation of ex-British territories in Southeast Asia, in which the Federation 
of Malaya would be dominant, was promulgated in May 1961.  
 
What or who made the policies of SLL/SAYA during this period? Previous 
scholars have outlined the contours of SLL/SAYA policies without analysing the 
influence of personalities on the course of history.1 This thesis has assembled for the 
first time the underground personalities behind Sarawak’s clandestine communist 
movement and the strategies and aims behind their organisation. Did personalities 
make any decisive difference to the history of Sarawak’s revolution? While the 
current historiography has taken little account of the role of personalities in shaping 
the course of the movement, this thesis argues that personalities did make a difference. 
Three leaders stand out in the early history of SLL: Wen Ming Chyuan, Bong Kee 
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Sarawak.  
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Chok and Lim Ho Kui. Wen’s level-headed calculations, Bong’s open charisma, and 
Lim’s meticulous underground organisation in the labour movement combined to 
bring fruition to the ‘masses’ line’ policy during the constitutional struggle (1956-63). 
At decisive moments, during June (Wen and Bong) and December 1962 (Lim), their 
assessments and decisions changed the course of the revolutionary struggle of SLL. 
The role of personalities warrants further research. A more in-depth study of Wen 
Ming Chyuan’s background and his reading of the times, for example, will help to 
unlock several mysteries surrounding the evolution of the revolutionary movement.2 
 
 The previous chapter closed with Lim Ho Kui’s decision in December 1962 to 
take the armed struggle route. There has been much debate among ex-comrades, 
informed by hindsight, about the wisdom and legitimacy of Lim’s move.3 Yet there is 
no doubt that, conditioned by Communist theories of armed struggle, thousands of 
SLL/SAYA members rallied to Lim’s orders. Furthermore, Wen Ming Chyuan’s and 
Bong Kee Chok’s active participation in leading the armed struggle upon their return 
to the region indicates the top SLL leadership’s consensus on the armed struggle route. 
This thesis suggests that the roots of SLL/SAYA participation in the Indonesian-led 
‘Confrontation’ (1963-66) and its continued armed opposition to the Malaysian state 
up to 1990 stemmed from a nascent Sarawak nationalist movement that began to take 
shape within the Chinese community after the Second World War. This movement 
culminated in the founding of SLL in July 1953 by what was essentially a group of 
radical Chinese youth. They were no doubt inspired by the global Communist 
movement, foremost of which was the China model, to conceive of and organise a 
similar revolution for their newly adopted homeland – Sarawak. In the final analysis, 
the Communist ideals of egalitarianism, minzu-nationalist dreams for independence, 
and an effectively managed and disciplined organisation that took root during the 
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period 1945-1963 were decisive in sustaining the socialist revolution that held out in 
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